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DEMOCRACY, DEFERENCE, AND 
COMPROMISE: UNDERSTANDING AND 
REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Scott P. Bloomberg* 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court interpreted the government’s 
interest in preventing corruption as being limited to preventing quid pro quo—
cash-for-votes—corruption. This narrow interpretation drastically 
circumscribed legislatures’ abilities to regulate the financing of elections, in 
turn prompting scholars to propose a number of reforms for broadening the 
government interest in campaign finance cases. These reforms include urging 
the Court to recognize a new government interest such as political equality, to 
adopt a broader understanding of corruption, and to be more deferential to 
legislatures in defining corruption. 
Building upon that body of scholarship, this Article begins with a 
descriptive account of campaign finance jurisprudence that identifies various 
conceptions of corruption found in the case law. The Article then explains how 
these conceptions of corruption are animated by underlying disagreements 
about democracy and deference. More particularly, one group of Justices 
believes that preserving a robust process of public opinion formation is 
paramount in campaign finance cases, and that individual rights and political 
process concerns warrant intervention in defining corruption. The other group 
of Justices believes that the deployment of concentrated wealth in elections 
impairs legislative responsiveness to public opinion and that the Court should 
defer to legislative expertise in defining corruption. 
Having presented this account, the Article proposes a reform to 
accommodate both groups of Justices’ concerns in campaign finance cases. 
This reform, which I call the Compromise Methodology, instructs the Court to 
defer to the legislature’s understanding of the anticorruption interest when the 
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campaign finance law in question protects either: (a) legislative 
responsiveness to public opinion; or (b) the process of public opinion 
formation. If the law protects neither of these concerns, then the Court 
intervenes and finds that the anticorruption interest cannot justify the law. 
Aside from this reframing of the anticorruption interest, the Compromise 
Methodology leaves the Court’s ordinary decision-making process intact. The 
Court can still determine whether a campaign finance law impacts individual 
rights and whether a law is sufficiently tailored to the anticorruption interest 
to withstand scrutiny. I argue that the Compromise Methodology locates 
valuable middle ground in campaign finance jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has held that the only government interest 
that allows legislatures to impose campaign finance restrictions is the 
interest in preventing corruption.1 In Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission,2 the Court interpreted this anticorruption 
interest as being limited to the prevention of a particularly narrow form 
of quid pro quo—cash-for-votes—corruption.3 This narrow 
understanding of the anticorruption interest has drastically 
circumscribed legislatures’ abilities to regulate the financing of 
elections,4 prompting calls for reform from the public and from 
scholars. While popular reform groups have focused on overturning 
the Citizens United Court’s holdings regarding money-as-speech and 
corporate personhood,5 many scholars have focused on the Court’s 
understanding of the anticorruption interest. Amongst this group, 
some have pushed for a return to the broader understanding of the 
 
 1. See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008) (collecting cases). 
 2. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 3. Id. at 357–60; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS 
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 241–43 (2011) (explaining that the Citizens United Court 
conceived of corruption only in terms of cash-for-votes corruption and failed to recognize the type 
of corruption caused by legislative dependence on wealthy campaign financiers). 
 4. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 21 
(2012) (arguing that the Court’s holding regarding the anticorruption interest in Citizens United 
prevents “almost all government regulation of campaign finance beyond transactions directly 
involving a political party or candidate” by “narrowing . . . the government interest in the prevention 
of corruption,” as compared to how that interest had been previously understood). 
 5. Several of the leading campaign finance reform organizations have centered their 
campaigns around contesting the idea of corporate personhood and money-as-speech. See, e.g., 
About Us, END CITIZENS UNITED, www.endcitizensunited.org/about  
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200201091459/https://endcitizensunited.org/about/] (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2020) (seeking to overturn Citizens United and describing the decision as “establish[ing] 
the legal basis for the idea that ‘corporations are people’”); The Supreme Court Ruling, PUB. 
CITIZEN, https://democracyisforpeople.org/page.cfm?id=18 (last visited April 5, 2020) (describing 
Citizens United as announcing “that corporations have a constitutional right to spend unlimited 
amounts of money to promote or defeat candidates”); What Is the Problem?, FREE SPEECH FOR 
PEOPLE, https://freespeechforpeople.org/the-amendment/what-is-the-problem  
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200512020544/https://freespeechforpeople.org:443/the-
amendment/what-is-the-problem/] (last visited May 12, 2020) (explaining that the Court has 
wrongly “endorsed the dangerous fiction that corporations have the same constitutional rights as 
living, breathing people” and “that campaign spending is a form of speech protected by the First 
Amendment”); see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy 
and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (2012) (“The popular reaction to Citizens United was swift 
and overwhelmingly negative. The shorthand version, according to popular perception, was that 
the Court had added to Buckley’s debatable equation that ‘money is speech’ the more pernicious 
equation that ‘corporations are people.’”). 
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anticorruption interest advanced by the Court in earlier cases,6 such as 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission7 and Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce.8 Others have argued that preventing 
corruption is not the only interest at play when a legislature restricts 
the financing of elections, and so the Court should recognize other 
government interests, such as electoral integrity, political equality, or 
political participation.9 And, a persuasive article by Professor Deborah 
Hellman posits that the Court should be more deferential to Congress 
in campaign finance cases because defining corruption (in the context 
of the anticorruption interest) requires making subjective democratic 
judgments best left to the legislative branch.10 
This Article builds upon this body of reform-minded scholarship. 
The Article first offers a unique descriptive account of campaign 
finance jurisprudence that places the relationship between the 
anticorruption interest, democracy, and deference at the forefront. 
Based on that descriptive account, I offer a reform for deciding 
campaign finance cases called the “Compromise Methodology.” 
Accommodating the Justices’ clashing notions of democracy and 
deference in campaign finance cases, the methodology forces the 
Court to defer to Congress’ understanding of corruption, but only in 
some situations. 
More particularly, the Article’s descriptive account shows that the 
Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence includes myriad conceptions 
 
 6. See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 143 (2003) (noting that the 
Court has “not limited [the anticorruption] interest to the elimination of cash-for-votes exchanges”), 
overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) (interpreting the anticorruption interest to 
extend beyond quid-pro-quo transactions), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010); LESSIG, supra note 3, at 230–32 (advancing a conception of corruption that 
includes legislative dependence on financial support from the wealthy); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, 
CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 276–
93 (Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (arguing for a broad understanding of corruption). 
 7. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010). 
 8. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010). 
 9. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 186–87 (2016) (proposing a new 
government interest in political equality); ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 61–62 (Harvard Univ. Press 2014); Spencer Overton, 
The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259, 1273 (2012) (proposing a new government interest 
in political participation). 
 10. See Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1385 (2013). 
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of corruption, ranging from narrow to broad. The factors that lead the 
Justices to settle on one conception of corruption over another are 
largely unspoken, but a careful examination of the case law reveals 
that the Justices’ understandings of corruption are dependent on 
underlying assumptions about democracy and deference.11 One group 
of Justices consistently expresses concern about how campaign 
finance laws impact the process of public opinion formation necessary 
to maintain democratic self-governance. This group also rejects calls 
to defer to legislatures in defining corruption, believing that such 
deference is unwarranted given the individual rights and political 
process concerns present in campaign finance cases. Accordingly, this 
group, which I shall call the “Interventionist Justices,” defines 
corruption narrowly and without deference, so that legislatures cannot 
interrupt the free flow of public discourse, curtail individual rights, or 
clog political processes. The other group of Justices consistently 
expresses concern about how the expenditure of large sums of money 
in elections can degrade legislative responsiveness to public opinion 
in our democracy. This group also believes that the Court should defer 
to legislatures in defining corruption given legislatures’ expertise in 
matters of corruption prevention. These “Deferential Justices” 
accordingly define corruption broadly and deferentially, so that 
legislatures can protect responsiveness to the public. 
Despite these positions being seemingly far apart, I believe 
finding a middle ground to accommodate both groups of Justices’ 
concerns regarding democracy and deference is possible. The 
Compromise Methodology that I propose here accomplishes this task 
by altering how courts define the anticorruption interest. It instructs 
courts to defer to Congress’ understanding of the anticorruption 
interest when a campaign finance law protects against a practice that 
impairs either legislative responsiveness or public opinion formation. 
If the restriction does not protect either of these “democratic 
concerns,” then the Court must intervene and find that the 
anticorruption interest does not encompass the law in question. This 
reform would give legislatures a bigger role in defining corruption 
while still preserving some space for courts to sculpt the contours of 
the government interest. 
 
 11. My observations in this portion of the Article in particular build upon the exceptional work 
done by POST, supra note 9, at 55–69, and Hellman, supra note 10, at 1391–401. 
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Aside from altering how the Court goes about defining the 
anticorruption interest, the methodology preserves the Court’s 
ordinary practice of determining whether a campaign finance law 
impacts individual rights and whether the restriction is sufficiently 
tailored to the anticorruption interest. Preserving the status quo in 
these areas helps to accommodate the Interventionist Justices’ 
individual rights and political process concerns. 
Importantly, I do not claim in this Article that the Compromise 
Methodology is normatively the best way to decide campaign finance 
cases. The Compromise Methodology is just that—a compromise 
designed to forge common ground between two groups of Justices 
whose positions are seemingly far apart. While I thus leave open the 
possibility that more drastic reforms may produce better normative 
results, these reforms are more revolution than evolution. A 
jurisprudential revolution may someday come to campaign finance 
law, but reformers also need to be prepared for the possibility that the 
jurisprudence evolves incrementally through compromise. Changes to 
the Court’s ideological composition, the emergence of a centrist 
swing-vote Justice, and stare decisis concerns could all drive this 
result. In such a situation, the Compromise Methodology presents an 
ideal path forward. 
In Part I of this Article I present a descriptive account of the 
anticorruption interest that explores various conceptions of corruption 
advanced by the Justices in campaign finance cases. In Part II I unpack 
this descriptive account to reveal the issues of democracy and 
deference that animate these myriad conceptions of corruption. I then 
begin Part III by introducing and explaining the benefits of the 
Compromise Methodology. Once I have done so, I illustrate how the 
methodology would work in practice by applying it to two campaign 
finance cases, I distinguish the methodology from other proposed 
reforms, and I address potential criticisms. Part IV briefly concludes 
the Article. 
I.  THE MANY VARIATIONS OF CORRUPTION 
The descriptive account I offer here begins with the seminal case 
of Buckley v. Valeo,12 where the Court recognized the government’s 
interest in preventing corruption but left important questions about the 
 
 12. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
(7) 53.4_BLOOMBERG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/2/20  10:28 AM 
902 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:895 
scope of that interest unanswered. I then proceed to Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce.13 There, a division emerges on the Court 
between one group of Justices who conceives of the anticorruption 
interest broadly and another who conceives of the interest narrowly. 
This broad-versus-narrow dichotomization, however, does not fully 
capture the Justices’ disagreement over the meaning of corruption in 
campaign finance cases. Rather, as I shall explain, the case law 
includes myriad understandings of corruption. These understandings 
vary depending upon the identities of the corruptor and the corruptee 
at issue in the case, and the method of corruption involved. 
A.  Buckley’s Imprecision 
The seminal case in campaign finance law, and the starting point 
for most descriptive accounts of the jurisprudence, is Buckley v. Valeo. 
Buckley involved a number of challenges to the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 and its comprehensive 1974 amendments 
(FECA).14 In pertinent part, the Court upheld the law’s contribution 
limitations of $1,000 to a single candidate per election, and $25,000 
in the aggregate per annum.15 Further, it struck down FECA’s $1,000 
limitation on independent expenditures made “relative to a clearly 
identified candidate,” while circumscribing the meaning of that 
phrase.16 In reaching these decisions, the Court held that money used 
to facilitate political speech constituted speech itself, and not conduct, 
entitling it to First Amendment protection.17 
 
 13. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 652. 
 14. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6; see also Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263; Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 
86 Stat. 3 (1972). 
 15. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29, 38. 
 16. Id. at 39 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1975)). In striking FECA’s $1,000 
independent expenditure limitation, the Buckley Court found that the phrase “relative to a clearly 
identified candidate” would be unconstitutionally vague if not limited to “expenditures for 
communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate for federal office.” Id. at 44. Having constricted § 608(e)(1) in that manner, the Court 
found that the government’s anticorruption interest could not justify the restriction since the 
restriction could be easily circumvented by avoiding words of express advocacy. Id. at 45. 
 17. Id. at 15–16. The Court distinguished the expenditure of money from the conduct at issue 
in United States v. O’Brien, a case that “involved a defendant’s claim that the First Amendment 
prohibited his prosecution for burning his draft card because his act was ‘symbolic speech’ engaged 
in as a ‘demonstration against the war and against the draft.’” Id. at 16 (quoting United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)). It wrote that the “expenditure of money simply cannot be 
equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card,” as the Court “has never suggested that 
the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a 
nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.” Id. 
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Despite Buckley’s holding that campaign finance restrictions 
burdened First Amendment speech rights, the Court left unanswered 
important questions about the primary government interest offered to 
justify such restrictions: the anticorruption interest. In evaluating the 
constitutionality of FECA’s $1,000 contribution limitation, the Court 
recognized the potential for corruption “[u]nder a system of private 
financing of elections,” and concluded that “[t]o the extent that large 
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from . . . 
office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy 
is undermined.”18 It also declared that “the impact of the appearance 
of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for 
abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions” 
was of almost equal concern as quid pro quo corruption.19 Turning to 
FECA’s $1,000 limit on independent expenditures, the Court 
remarked that “the independent advocacy restricted by the provision 
does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent 
corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign 
contributions.”20 
These descriptions of corruption left the scope of the 
government’s anticorruption interest largely undefined. Most 
relevantly, the Court’s broad language in the “appearance of 
corruption” context and its “presently appear” hedge in the 
independent expenditure context left future Justices enough room to 
bend Buckley to reach their desired results.21 Furthermore, Buckley did 
 
 18. Id. at 26–27. 
 19. Id. at 27. 
 20. Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
 21. Compare Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (“In speaking of 
‘improper influence’ and ‘opportunities for abuse’ in addition to ‘quid pro quo arrangements,’ we 
recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat 
from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. 
at 27)), McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003) (“Our cases have firmly 
established that Congress’ legitimate interest extends . . . to curbing ‘undue influence on an 
officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.’” (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n 
v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)), overruled by Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), id. at 191–92 (“[A] plain reading 
of Buckley makes clear that the express advocacy limitation . . . was the product of statutory 
interpretation rather than a constitutional command.”), and Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 453 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the Buckley Court’s conclusion that 
independent expenditures did not “presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption” 
comparable to large contributions, and arguing that “Buckley expressly contemplated that an 
anticorruption rationale might justify restrictions on independent expenditures at a later date”), with 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 682 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(describing Buckley as holding “that independent expenditures to express the political views of 
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not address the question of corporate expenditures at all—though 
some of its plaintiffs were corporations. There too, future Justices 
would look to Buckley’s lack of detail on the topic as a signal, one way 
or the other.22 
B.  Austin’s Dichotomization 
The Buckley Court’s imprecision regarding the meaning of 
corruption and the scope of the anticorruption interest would cause a 
chasm to develop on the Court fourteen years later. In Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court took up a challenge to a 
Michigan law that prohibited corporations from using their general 
treasuries to make independent expenditures in connection with state 
elections.23 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Marshall, began 
by conceding that the campaign finance restriction imposed a First 
Amendment burden on the Chamber of Commerce.24 It nonetheless 
upheld the Michigan law, finding the campaign finance restriction 
justified by the anticorruption interest.25 
In reaching this result, the majority offered a broad interpretation 
of the anticorruption interest. It began by noting the “special 
advantages” granted to corporations by state law.26 These advantages, 
including “limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of 
the accumulation and distribution of assets,” not only “allow 
corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also 
permit them to use ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace’ 
 
individuals and associations do not raise a sufficient threat of corruption to justify prohibition”), 
overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), McConnell, 540 U.S. 
at 292 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Buckley made clear . . . that the 
corruption interest only justifies regulating candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of what we can 
call the ‘quids’ in the quid pro quo formulation.”), and Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345 (majority 
opinion) (“[Buckley] emphasized that ‘the independent expenditure ceiling . . . fails to serve any 
substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the 
electoral process.’” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47–48)). 
 22. Compare, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 453 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Buckley did not evaluate corporate expenditures specifically.”), with Austin, 
494 U.S. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the “plaintiffs in [Buckley] included 
corporations”). 
 23. Austin, 494 U.S. at 654 (majority opinion). 
 24. Id. at 657 (“Certainly, the use of funds to support a political candidate is ‘speech’; 
independent campaign expenditures constitute ‘political expression at the core of our electoral 
process and of the First Amendment freedoms.’ [Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39]. . . . The mere fact that 
the Chamber is a corporation does not remove its speech from the ambit of the First Amendment. 
[First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)].”). 
 25. Id. at 656. 
 26. Id. at 658. 
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to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.’”27 Thus, 
“the compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption 
support[s] the restriction of the influence of political war chests 
funneled through the corporate form.”28 
From there, the Austin majority concluded that regardless of 
whether corporate independent expenditures could lead to quid pro 
quo—cash-for-votes—corruption, Michigan’s law could be justified 
as preventing a “different type of corruption in the political arena.”29 
Namely, “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations 
of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and 
that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.”30 Under this conception of corruption, 
it makes no difference whether the corporation gives money directly 
to a candidate for office or spends it independently in his support. 
“Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed 
in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes 
the guise of political contributions.”31 
The dissents, authored by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, both 
advanced a far narrower understanding of the anticorruption interest. 
Both attacked the majority’s conclusion that the special advantages 
conferred on corporations by the state gave the state an interest in 
preventing corruption that justified restricting corporate independent 
expenditures.32 Justice Scalia, when discussing the majority’s “new” 
form of corruption, described it as not being “‘corruption,’ as English 
speakers understand that term.”33 Corruption—the way English 
speakers understand it, according to Justice Scalia—is synonymous 
with quid pro quo corruption, as discussed in the portion of Buckley 
 
 27. Id. at 658–59 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 
238, 257 (1986)). 
 28. Id. at 659 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative 
Political Action Comm. (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480, 500–01 (1985)). 
 29. Id. at 659–60. 
 30. Id. at 660. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 680–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for concluding that the special 
advantages conferred upon corporations by the state permitted the state to exact First Amendment 
concessions in exchange for the advantages); id. at 703 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (characterizing 
the majority’s “new” government interest of combating the effects of corporate wealth as “novel”). 
 33. Id. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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dedicated to FECA’s contribution restrictions.34 It is the classic image 
of a politician accepting a briefcase full of cash in exchange for a vote, 
not a politician being influenced by a corporation’s ad-buy in his 
support. 
Justice Kennedy echoed this conception of corruption. He defined 
the term as “‘a subversion of the political process’ whereby ‘elected 
officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by 
the prospect of financial gain.’”35 The conception of corruption 
advanced by the majority did not fit within this definition at all, he 
argued. It was instead “the impermissible [interest] of altering political 
debate by muting the impact of certain speakers,”36 an interest in 
speech equalization that the Court had already rejected in Buckley and 
in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.37 
Two very different understandings of the anticorruption interest 
arise from Austin. One conceives of corporations as posing threats 
unique from natural persons and believes that independent 
expenditures carry corruptive potential. The other sees no special 
threat created by the corporate form and conceives of corruption only 
in quid pro quo terms, which does not include independent 
expenditures. Though this disagreement continues to present day, the 
Justices’ divide over the anticorruption interest is far more complex 
than this straightforward dichotomization suggests. 
 
 34. Id. at 683–84 (citing Buckley’s description of quid pro quo corruption and characterizing 
the majority’s broader conception of corruption—the corrosive influence of corporate wealth—as 
dangerously broad). 
 35. Id. at 703 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (alteration omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting 
NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)). Interestingly, Justice Kennedy’s quotation of NCPAC only 
encompasses part of the definition of corruption articulated by then-Justice Rehnquist in that case. 
After the phrase “by the prospect of financial gain,” Justice Rehnquist included, “or infusions of 
money into their campaigns.” NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497. This definitional distinction potentially has 
tremendous consequences for the constitutionality of contribution limitations. If the only 
constitutionally cognizable method of corruption is the sale of legislative favors for personal 
financial enrichment, then contribution limitations are largely prophylactic, and stand on weaker 
constitutional footing. E.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428–29 (2000) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing bribery laws as being more narrowly tailored to address quid 
pro quo corruption than contribution limitations and arguing that the latter are unconstitutional for 
that reason). If, however, corruption includes the sale of legislative favors in exchange for campaign 
donations, then contribution limitations are much more closely tailored to the evil sought to be 
extinguished. 
 36. Austin, 494 U.S. at 703–04 (referencing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 
(1978)). 
 37. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
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C.  The Many Variations of Corruption 
To organize the myriad understandings of corruption found in 
campaign finance cases, I have created three categories of corruption 
variations. The first category involves variations of corruption 
dependent on the identity of the corruptor. For example, a corruptor 
could be a corporation or a natural person. A corruptor could also be 
a non-profit corporation, a political action committee, or an 
unincorporated group of natural persons. The second category 
involves variations of corruption dependent on the identity of the 
corruptee. It may be an individual legislator who is being corrupted. 
Or perhaps a political party, or entire electoral system, could become 
corrupted. 
The third category includes variations of corruption dependent on 
the method of corruption involved. Corruption (or its appearance) may 
occur through an exchange of cash for legislative favors. I will refer 
to this method of corruption as “narrow quid pro quo corruption.” 
Corruption may also occur through the conferring of a non-cash 
benefit upon a corruptor in exchange for a legislative favor. The 
paradigmatic example of this method of corruption is airing an 
advertisement supporting an official in exchange for a legislative 
favor. I will call this “broad quid pro quo corruption,” since—like 
cash-for-votes corruption—it still includes an exchange of favors. 
Finally, corruption may occur in less obvious ways, including most 
prominently the dependence legislators may develop on the financial 
support of wealthy corporations and individuals. I will borrow a term 
from Professor Lessig38 and title this latter method of corruption 
“dependence corruption.” 
1.  Corruptor Variations 
The significance of the corruptor’s identity was at the forefront in 
Austin. As discussed above, the Austin Court found that corporations 
presented a “different” type of corruption, one going beyond quid pro 
quo and arising from “the corrosive and distorting effects” of 
corporations’ “immense aggregations of wealth.”39 The Court made 
clear that its decision to uphold Michigan’s corporate expenditure 
restriction rested specifically on the unique attributes of corporations, 
 
 38. See LESSIG, supra note 3, at 228–29. 
 39. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659–60 (majority opinion). 
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insinuating that it would not have upheld a similar restriction on 
wealthy individuals. “We emphasize that the mere fact that 
corporations may accumulate large amounts of wealth is not the 
justification for [the Michigan law]; rather, the unique state-conferred 
corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries 
warrants the limit on independent expenditures.”40 
The Austin dissenters, on the other hand, questioned the 
significance of the potential corruptor’s corporate identity.41 For 
example, Justice Scalia opined that “[c]ertain uses of ‘massive wealth’ 
in the electoral process—whether or not the wealth is the result of 
‘special advantages’ conferred by the State—pose a substantial risk of 
corruption which constitutes a compelling need for the regulation of 
speech.”42 The corporate identity of the corruptor in Austin was thus 
of tremendous consequence to the majority, but completely 
unimportant to the dissenters. 
A second case illustrating the significance of corruptor identity is 
Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political 
Action Committee (NCPAC).43 At issue in NCPAC was a provision of 
the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act that made it a crime for 
any political committee to independently spend more than $1,000 in 
support of a presidential candidate who chose to receive public 
funding.44 The Court found the government’s anticorruption interest 
insufficient to justify the law.45 
In so holding, the Court distinguished the corruptive danger posed 
by political committees from that posed by corporations.46 It reasoned 
that Congress was justified in restricting the political speech of even 
non-profit corporations as a prophylactic measure to address “the evil 
of potential corruption” from for-profit corporations that “had long 
been recognized.”47 But political committees were “quite different 
from the traditional corporations organized for economic gain,” as 
they were “designed expressly to participate in political debate,”48 and 
 
 40. Id. at 660. 
 41. See id. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. 
 43. 470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
 44. Id. at 482. 
 45. See id. at 496–98. 
 46. Id. at 500. 
 47. Id. (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982)). 
 48. Id. 
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could only accept donations in accordance with FECA’s contribution 
limitations.49 The NCPAC Court accordingly gave Congress much less 
leash to restrict the speech of political committees—as opposed to 
corporations—under the specter of preventing corruption.50 
2.  Corruptee Variations 
In NCPAC, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, described 
corruption as occurring when “[e]lected officials are influenced to act 
contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain 
to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns.”51 This 
legislator-centric conception of corruption is common in campaign 
finance jurisprudence.52 Yet it is hardly manifest that only legislators 
can be corrupted. Indeed, examples from the case law evince 
variations of corruption dependent on the identification of institutions 
as corruptees. 
To illustrate the corruptee-based variations of corruption, 
consider first Davis v. Federal Election Commission.53 At issue in 
Davis was the so-called Millionaire’s Amendment provision of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).54 This provision applied 
when one candidate financed his campaign with over $350,000 from 
their own pocket, and their opponent did not.55 In such cases, the non-
self-financing candidate could collect campaign contributions in 
amounts of up to $6,900, rather than the $2,300 limit otherwise 
 
 49. Though not mentioned explicitly, the NCPAC Court alludes to this point by commenting 
that the “amounts given to the PACs are overwhelmingly small contributions, well under the $1,000 
limit on contributions upheld in Buckley.” Id. at 497; see also Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 112(2), 90 Stat. 475, 486–87 (establishing a $5,000 
annual limitation for contributions to a “political committee”). 
 50. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 500 (opining that “deference to a congressional determination of the 
need for a prophylactic rule” does not justify a provision that “indiscriminately lumps with 
corporations any ‘committee, association or organization’” (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 9002(9) (2012) 
(defining “political committee”))). 
 51. Id. at 497 (emphasis added). 
 52. E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (“The fact that 
speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials 
are corrupt.” (emphases added)); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003) 
(“The idea that large contributions to a national party can corrupt . . . federal candidates and 
officeholders is neither novel nor implausible.” (emphasis added)), overruled by Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 53. 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 54. Id. at 729; see also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-155, § 319, 
116 Stat. 81, 109–12. 
 55. Davis, 554 U.S. at 729. 
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imposed by BCRA.56 Additionally, the provision lifted the $40,900 
cap on joint expenditures—expenditures coordinated between the 
party and candidate—for the non-self-financing candidate, allowing 
that candidate to get more financial support from their party.57 
Assessing the constitutionality of the Millionaire’s Amendment 
under the First Amendment begins with the question of whether it 
imposes a speech burden at all.58 If this threshold question is answered 
affirmatively, then Congress must have a government interest to 
justify the speech burden created by the Millionaire’s Amendment. 
But what is that government interest? If a jurist believes that the 
government’s anticorruption interest applies solely to prevent the 
corruption of individual legislators, it is hard to see how that interest 
could justify the law. How could a candidate become corrupt by 
spending their own money? In fact, if corruption of the candidate is 
the jurist’s sole concern, the jurist might think the law to be 
counterproductive, as it allows the non-self-financing candidate to 
accept donations in treble the amount of BCRA’s contribution limits. 
The Millionaire’s Amendment is a corruption-enhancing provision, 
not a corruption-preventing provision, to the jurist concerned solely 
with corruption of individual legislators.59 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 728–29. 
 58. There is certainly an argument that it does not. The self-financing candidate is not 
prevented or in any way restricted from funding additional speech. See id. at 753 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Davis cannot show that the Millionaire’s Amendment 
causes him . . . any First Amendment injury whatsoever. The Millionaire’s Amendment quiets no 
speech at all.”). The law, moreover, puts the non-self-financing candidate in a position to create 
more speech. Thus, the Millionaire’s Amendment arguably increases the speech of the non-self-
financing candidate while not decreasing the speech of the self-financing candidate. Of course, 
there is an argument to the contrary; namely, that the benefit conferred upon the non-self-financing 
candidate creates a disincentive—or penalty—for speech funded from his own pocket above 
$350,000. See id. at 740 (majority opinion) (“[A] candidate who wishes to exercise [her right to 
make unlimited personal expenditures] has two choices: abide by a limit on personal expenditures 
or endure the burden that is placed on that right by the activation of a scheme of discriminatory 
contribution limits.”). 
 59. Indeed, this was the exact tack taken by the Court in striking down the Millionaire’s 
Amendment. Quoting Buckley, Justice Alito noted that “[f]ar from preventing these evils, ‘the use 
of personal funds . . . reduces the candidate’s dependence on outside contributions and thereby 
counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to which contribution limitations 
are directed.’” Id. at 738 (alteration omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976)). 
He described Buckley as reasoning “that reliance on personal funds reduces the threat of corruption, 
and therefore [the Millionaire’s Amendment], by discouraging use of personal funds, disserves the 
anticorruption interest.” Id. at 740–41 (emphasis in original). 
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However, the analysis is wholly different if the jurist identifies 
institutions as corruptees. Then, the advantage held by independently 
wealthy candidates arguably transforms a normatively egalitarian or 
meritocratic electoral system into a plutocratic institution. To prevent 
this transformation—or corruption—of the institution, then, the jurist 
may consider Congress to be justified in penalizing candidates who 
self-finance by providing a benefit to their non-self-financing 
opponent. 
The Davis dissenters expressed precisely this sentiment, albeit 
outside the rhetorical parameters of the anticorruption interest. They 
announced that it was “simply wrong” to suggest that the 
anticorruption interest “is the sole governmental interest sufficient to 
support campaign finance regulations.”60 Instead, the Court has “long 
recognized the strength of an independent governmental interest in 
reducing both the influence of wealth on the outcomes of elections, 
and the appearance that wealth alone dictates those results.”61 This 
principle can easily be understood as existing within the confines of 
the government’s anticorruption interest, so long as the corruptee is 
the electoral system.62 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti also provides a fitting 
example of a corruptee-based variation of corruption.63 At issue in 
Bellotti was whether Massachusetts could prevent for-profit 
corporations from making political expenditures to influence the vote 
on ballot questions that did not “materially affect” their business 
interests.64 The Court struck the Massachusetts law, reasoning that 
corporate speech was entitled to First Amendment protection.65 
However, the Court was careful to circumscribe the reach of its 
holding. It distinguished Massachusetts’ restriction on corporate 
expenditures in ballot measure contests from the “quite different 
context of participation in a political campaign for election to public 
 
 60. Id. at 754 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 61. Id. at 755. 
 62. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 236 (2014) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (describing the anticorruption interest as “an interest in maintaining the integrity of our 
public governmental institutions”). 
 63. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 784 (“We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the 
decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection 
of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation that cannot 
prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its business or property.”). 
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office.”66 Laws prohibiting corporate expenditures in candidate 
elections were focused on “the problem of corruption of elected 
representatives through the creation of political debts,” a problem 
which of course is irrelevant in ballot measure contests.67 The defining 
issue for the Bellotti majority, then, was not so much the 
characteristics of corporations, but the absence of an individual 
legislator to be corrupted by those corporations. 
For the Bellotti dissenters, the absence of an individual legislator 
to corrupt was unimportant. The dissenting Justices recognized a 
government interest that extended to preventing corruption of “the 
very heart of our democracy, the electoral process.”68 They were 
concerned with the use of corporate wealth to “acquire an unfair 
advantage in the political process.”69 This conception of corruption, 
which included the electoral process itself as a corruptee, justified the 
Massachusetts law. On the other hand, the majority’s narrower idea 
about corruptees left Massachusetts without a government interest to 
restrict (what it found to be) protected speech. 
Finally, consider the case of McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
Commission.70 McCutcheon involved the aggregate contribution 
limitation first instituted by FECA and upheld by Buckley nearly forty 
years earlier.71 By 2014, the law capped campaign contributions at an 
aggregate amount of roughly $120,000 per two-year election cycle.72 
The Court struck this restriction, finding that it did not prevent 
corruption or its appearance.73 In reaching this conclusion, Chief 
Justice Roberts’ reasoning, writing for the Court, proceeded as 
follows: The base contribution limit—the most a donor can give to an 
individual candidate—was $5,200. Thus, Congress believed that 
contributions of $5,200 or less would not cause corruption.74 And, if 
 
 66. Id. at 788 n.26. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. 
 70. 572 U.S. 185 (2014). 
 71. Id. at 193; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) (upholding FECA’s “overall 
$25,000 limitation on total contributions by an individual during any calendar year”). 
 72. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 194 (“All told, an individual may contribute up to $123,200 to 
candidate and noncandidate committees during each two-year election cycle.”). 
 73. Id. at 218 (“Buckley upheld aggregate limits only on the ground that they prevented 
channeling money to candidates beyond the base limits. The absence of such a prospect today belies 
the Government’s asserted objective of preventing corruption or its appearance.”). 
 74. Id. at 210 (“Congress’s selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that 
contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption.”). 
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Congress believed that $5,200 given to nine candidates would not 
corrupt any of those nine candidates, giving $5,200 to a tenth 
candidate (putting the donor over the aggregate limit) would not 
corrupt that candidate.75 For that matter, giving $5,200 to one hundred 
candidates would not corrupt the eleventh through hundredth.76 Thus, 
the aggregate limitation only prevents corruption insofar as it prevents 
circumvention of the $5,200 base limit.77 For various reasons, the 
Court found that the aggregate limit did not prevent circumvention of 
that base limit.78 
This analysis is dependent upon a conception of corruption in 
which only individual legislators are corruptees. It neglects the 
possibility that institutions, such as political parties, can be corrupted. 
Indeed, the removal of the aggregate limitation allows a single donor 
to contribute over $1 million to a political party during an election 
cycle by giving the maximum base amount to each state party 
committee and the national party committees.79 This figure may be 
coupled with over $2 million in donations to federal candidates of the 
same party.80 
 
 75. Id. (“If there is no corruption concern in giving nine candidates up to $5,200 each, it is 
difficult to understand how a tenth candidate can be regarded as corruptible if given $1,801, and all 
others corruptible if given a dime.”). 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. (“[I]f there is no risk that additional candidates will be corrupted by donations of up to 
$5,200, then the Government must defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they prevent 
circumvention of the base limits.”). 
 78. Id. at 220. The Court rejected two hypothetical scenarios that would allow donors to 
circumvent the $5,200 base contribution limit in the absence of an aggregate limitation. The first 
was the idea that a donor could contribute to a large number of non-connected political action 
committees, who would all then funnel the donor’s money to a single candidate. Id. at 211. The 
second was the idea that a donor would give a large check to a joint fundraising committee 
comprised of a candidate’s committee, a national party committee, and a large number of state party 
committees. The committees would allocate the check as appropriate under the base limits, then 
transfer the sum total to one committee, who could use the money to engage in coordinated 
expenditures on behalf of the candidate. Id. at 214–15. Justice Roberts concluded that “experience 
and common sense” foreclosed the possibility of this scenario and described it as being “divorced 
from reality.” Id. at 216. But see Letter from Brad C. Deutsch, Counsel to Bernie 2016, Inc., to 
Debbie Wasserman-Schultz, Chair, Democratic Nat’l Comm. 1–2 (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160418213133/https://berniesanders.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/bernie-2016-letter-to-dnc-1.pdf (describing how presidential candidate 
Hillary Clinton established a joint fundraising committee with the DNC and state Democratic 
Parties and then used the proceeds of the committee’s fundraising efforts for the benefit of the 
Clinton campaign). 
 79. See McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 245, 268 tbl.1 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (illustrating how a 
single donor can contribute $1,194,400 to a political party). 
 80. Id. at 247, 268 tbl.2(a) (illustrating how a single donor can contribute over $2.4 million to 
a party’s candidates). 
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Justice Breyer, writing for the dissenting Justices, outlined how 
much of this over-$3-million could be funneled to a single candidate, 
absent the aggregate limitation.81 But, was this step of Justice Breyer’s 
analysis even necessary? Not under a theory of corruption that 
includes political parties as potential corruptees. It would be enough 
that an individual could give such large sums directly to a party. 
3.  Method of Corruption Variations 
The Justices’ disagreement over methods of corruption is 
sometimes framed in terms of “quid pro quo” corruption versus 
“access and influence” corruption. Indeed, dissenting in part and 
concurring in part in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, this 
was exactly how Justice Kennedy framed his disagreement with the 
majority.82 Corruption occurs, according to Justice Kennedy, when a 
legislator is unduly influenced to vote a certain way by the prospect of 
financial gain.83 The danger of such corruption is only present when a 
legislator receives a quid.84 The quid—a thing of value—may unduly 
influence the legislator to vote a certain way, creating a quid pro quo 
exchange.85 To Justice Kennedy, preventing this method of corruption 
is the only government interest sufficient to restrict campaign 
financing.86 
The McConnell majority, again according to Justice Kennedy, 
erred by framing corruption in terms of access and influence. The 
majority’s conclusion that “access peddling by the parties equals 
corruption by the candidates” errantly relies “solely on the fact that 
access flowed from the conduct” and ignores the lack of a quid pro 
 
 81. Id. at 248, 269 tbl.2(b) (describing how a joint fundraising committee could direct at least 
$2.37 million from a single donor to a single candidate). 
 82. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 295 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 83. Id. at 294 (“The very aim of Buckley’s standard, however, was to define undue influence 
by reference to the presence of quid pro quo involving the officeholder.”). 
 84. Id. at 295 (“Congress’ interest in preventing corruption provides a basis for regulating 
federal candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of quids, whether or not the candidate or officeholder 
corruptly received them. Conversely, the rule requires the Court to strike down campaign finance 
regulations when they do not add regulation to ‘actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements.’” 
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976)). 
 85. Id. at 292–93 (characterizing, with approval, the Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 
377 (2000) Court’s conception of quid pro quo corruption as being limited to “actual corrupt, vote-
buying exchanges”). 
 86. Id. at 298 (stating that various provisions of BCRA “cannot stand because they do not add 
regulation to conduct that poses a demonstrable quid pro quo danger”). 
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quo exchange.87 “Access in itself, however, shows only that in a 
general sense an officeholder favors someone or that someone has 
influence on the officeholder. There is no basis, in law or in fact, to 
say favoritism or influence in general is the same as corrupt favoritism 
or influence in particular.”88 
The jurisprudential disagreements surrounding the method of 
corruption, however, are more complex than Justice Kennedy’s 
framing of the issue leads on. Even within the quid pro quo method of 
corruption, the Justices disagree about both what constitutes a quid 
and what constitutes a quo. The Justices further disagree about 
whether methods of corruption outside of the quid pro quo framework 
can justify campaign finance restrictions. 
A comparison of Justice Kennedy’s McConnell dissent and 
Justice Stevens’ Citizens United dissent illustrates this first point. The 
primary issues in McConnell concerned two provisions of BCRA.89 
The first was BCRA’s ban on soft money contributions to political 
parties.90 Such contributions could be made in unlimited amounts and 
because they were used to finance advertisements that did not call for 
the express election or defeat of a candidate, they were not subject to 
federal law’s restriction on corporate and union contributions.91 The 
second was BCRA’s restriction of “Electioneering 
Communications”—communications referencing a candidate close to 
election time funded by a corporation or union.92 
Justice Kennedy did not believe that the government’s 
anticorruption interest justified either provision of BCRA. He framed 
the inquiry into whether a certain practice has quid pro quo corruption 
potential as being “functional.”93 As described above, by this he meant 
that the Court should look to whether a quid has been given to the 
 
 87. Id. at 295. 
 88. Id. at 296. 
 89. Id. at 114 (majority opinion); see also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub L. 
No. 107-155, § 319, 116 Stat. 81, 109–12. 
 90. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 132–33 (describing one of BCRA’s “central provisions” as 
addressing Congress’ concerns about “the increasing use of soft money” to “influence federal 
elections”). 
 91. See generally id. at 122–25 (explaining soft money and summarizing the history of its 
increasing importance in federal elections). See also 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b) (2003) (transferred to 52 
U.S.C. § 30118) (prohibiting corporations and unions from making contributions and expenditures 
in connection with federal elections). 
 92. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189–90 (setting out BCRA § 201’s definition of 
“Electioneering Communications”). 
 93. Id. at 293 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
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elected official. If the answer to that question is “no,” then the 
government has no interest that justifies imposing a burden on the 
speaker.94 Crucially, Justice Kennedy means what he says quite 
literally. The quid—the thing of value—must actually be given to the 
elected official or candidate. It cannot be an action that accrues to the 
benefit of the candidate in some way but is never actually transferred 
to his control. Thus, when a campaign financier donates money to a 
political party and not to the candidate herself, the donation cannot 
constitute a quid.95 Under Justice Kennedy’s “functional” conception 
of the quid pro quo corruption method, then, the government cannot 
restrict soft money contributions or independent expenditures.96 
While the McConnell majority chided Justice Kennedy for 
limiting his quid pro quo analysis to contributions given directly to 
candidates,97 the more poignant attack on Justice Kennedy’s reasoning 
came six years later, once his became the majority view. Dissenting in 
Citizens United, Justice Stevens recognized methods of corruption 
beyond quid pro quo and sought to justify BCRA’s electioneering 
communications restriction on quid pro quo grounds as well.98 Quids, 
according to Justice Stevens, “encompass the myriad ways in which 
 
 94. Id. at 294 (“Congress’ interest in preventing corruption provides a basis for regulating 
federal candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of quids, whether or not the candidate or officeholder 
corruptly received them. Conversely, the rule requires the Court to strike down campaign finance 
regulations when they do not add regulation to ‘actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements.’” 
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976)). 
 95. Id. at 298–99 (explaining that BCRA’s soft money prohibition cannot be sustained by the 
government’s anticorruption interest because it “does not regulate federal candidates’ or 
officeholders’ receipt of quids”). 
 96. This illustrates the interplay of two different elements of corruption theory: the method 
element and the corruptee elements. If one believes that the parties themselves can become 
corrupted, then the fact that soft money is given to the parties and not the candidates becomes 
unimportant. Prohibiting soft money would then become justifiable even under Justice Kennedy’s 
narrow quid pro quo articulation of the method element. 
 97. Id. at 152 (majority opinion) (“Despite [Congress’s evidence] and the close ties that 
candidates and officeholders have with their parties, Justice Kennedy would limit Congress’ 
regulatory interest only to the prevention of the actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption ‘inherent 
in’ contributions made directly to, contributions made at the express behest of, and expenditures 
made in coordination with, a federal officeholder or candidate. Regulation of any other donation or 
expenditure—regardless of its size, the recipient’s relationship to the candidate or officeholder, its 
potential impact on a candidate’s election, its value to the candidate, or its unabashed and explicit 
intent to purchase influence—would, according to Justice Kennedy, simply be out of bounds.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 98. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 451–54 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“There is no need to take my side in the debate over the 
scope of the anticorruption interest to see that the Court’s merits holding is wrong. Even under the 
majority’s ‘crabbed view of corruption,’ the Government should not lose this case.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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outside parties may induce an officeholder to confer a legislative 
benefit in direct response to, or anticipation of, some outlay of money 
the parties have made or will make on behalf of the officeholder.”99 
The quid need not be given directly to the candidate to cause 
corruption or its appearance, it just needs to inure to the candidate’s 
benefit. Independent expenditures and soft money contributions—
particularly those made in large amounts—can thus be restricted by 
the government even under a quid pro quo framework, per Justice 
Stevens. 
Staying within this quid pro quo framework, the McConnell and 
Citizens United dissents also illustrate the Justices’ disagreement 
about quos. That is, in addition to disagreeing about what action taken 
by the corruptor—what quid—leads to corruption, the Justices 
disagree about what action taken by the corruptee—what quo—leads 
to corruption. This disagreement revolves around the question of 
whether access and influence are themselves quos. Consider Justice 
Scalia’s McConnell dissent. Therein, he writes that “it cannot be 
denied . . . that corporate (like noncorporate) allies will have greater 
access to the officeholder, and that he will tend to favor the same 
causes as those who support him (which is usually why they supported 
him).”100 Yet this access and influence, per Justice Scalia, is not itself 
a corruptive quo; to the contrary, it is “the nature of politics—if not 
indeed human nature.”101 The government, then, has no interest in 
preventing access and influence, even if that access and influence are 
purchased. 
Justice Stevens’ Citizens United dissent takes the opposite 
position on the purchasing of access: “Corruption can take many 
forms. Bribery may be the paradigm case. But the difference between 
selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree, not kind.”102 So 
too on the purchasing of influence. Justice Stevens believes that 
Congress can restrict campaign financing to ensure that legislators will 
decide issues “‘on the merits or the desires of their constituencies,’ 
and not ‘according to the wishes of those who have made large 
 
 99. Id. at 452. 
 100. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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financial contributions’—or expenditures—‘valued by the 
officeholder.’”103 
In addition to these variations based on the scope of the quid pro 
quo method of corruption, the Justices also disagree about whether 
corruption extends beyond quid pro quo exchanges. This type of 
corruption, which Professor Lessig has aptly dubbed “dependence 
corruption,” occurs when the influence of money affects legislative 
conduct even absent any exchange.104 
Justice Stevens’ Citizens United dissent describes this method of 
corruption as one involving “threats, both explicit and implicit.”105 
What Justice Stevens means, and what Lessig explains at length,106 is 
that legislators may base their votes on whether wealthy individuals 
and entities will spend for or against them in future elections, rather 
than basing their votes on the merits of legislation, or the desires of 
their constituents. Under a system that permits wealthy individuals and 
entities to make unlimited expenditures, then, financiers “with large 
war chests to deploy on electioneering may find democratically 
elected bodies becoming much more attuned to their interests.”107 In 
this way, the financiers have corrupted the legislator simply by virtue 
of their ability to make such large expenditures or contributions, 
regardless of whether they actually deploy their wealth to obtain their 
preferred legislative outcomes. Because dependence corruption does 
not involve a quid pro quo exchange (however broadly that framework 
is understood), Justice Kennedy and his like-minded colleagues do not 
believe the government has an interest in preventing it. Justice Stevens 
and his compatriots would, of course, disagree. 
 
This descriptive account of the anticorruption interest shows a 
jurisprudence that lacks any cohesive understanding of the interest. 
Indeed, depending on a Justice’s beliefs about the identities of the 
corruptors and corruptees, and the cognizable methods of corruption, 
the anticorruption interest may be as narrow as ensuring that 
individual candidates’ votes are not purchased in exchange for direct 
financial remuneration, or as broad as preventing the electoral system 
 
 103. Id. at 449 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153). 
 104. LESSIG, supra note 3, at 230–33. 
 105. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 106. See LESSIG, supra note 3, at 230–46. 
 107. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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from being corrupted by dependence on concentrated wealth. The 
obvious importance of the Justices’ conceptions of corruption to the 
outcome of campaign finance cases, coupled with the astounding 
range of possible understandings of corruption, together beg an 
incredibly important question: upon what are the Justices’ 
understandings of corruption based? I turn in Part II to addressing this 
crucial question. 
II.  DEMOCRACY AND DEFERENCE 
In Part II of this Article, I build upon insightful works by Hellman 
and Post to reveal how two factors animate the Justices’ disagreement 
regarding the meaning of corruption in campaign finance cases. The 
first factor involves a disagreement about democracy. Corruption is a 
derivative concept dependent on underlying assumptions about the 
institution involved. That is to say, whether you think an act is corrupt 
depends on your understanding of the institution that is supposedly 
being corrupted. When it comes to political corruption, the relevant 
institution is our democracy. And, in campaign finance cases, one 
group of Justices has defined corruption narrowly based on their 
concern with protecting the public option formation aspects of 
democracy, while the other group has defined corruption broadly 
based on their concern with protecting the legislative responsiveness 
aspects of democracy. 
But these democratic concerns do not fully explain the Justices’ 
disagreement about corruption. Instead, there is a second factor on 
which the Justices disagree: deference. The Justices disagree not only 
about what corruption means, but who ought to decide what corruption 
means. The group of Justices concerned with protecting public opinion 
formation also define corruption without deferring to Congress. These 
Interventionist Justices believe the Court should define corruption on 
its own terms given the individual rights and political processes that 
they believe are at issue in campaign finance cases. The group of 
Justices concerned with protecting legislative responsiveness believe 
the Court should defer to legislatures in defining corruption. These 
Deferential Justices recognize legislatures’ expertise in preventing 
corruption and believe legislatures are best suited to determine 
whether an act is corruptive. 
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A.  Democracy: Public Opinion or Legislative Responsiveness 
In 1992, an eccentric billionaire named Ross Perot ran for 
President of the United States as an independent candidate.108 Perot 
placed third in that race behind then-Governor Bill Clinton and then-
President George H.W. Bush, but commanded an impressive 
18.9 percent of the popular vote.109 In 1995, Perot decided to form his 
own political party, the Reform Party, to prepare for another bid at the 
presidency in 1996.110 
Seven years later, the Court decided McConnell and upheld 
BCRA’s electioneering communications restriction and its ban on soft 
money. In dissent, Justice Kennedy noted—almost in passing—that 
the soft money ban upheld by the McConnell Court would have 
prevented Ross Perot from spending $8 million of his own money to 
create the Reform Party.111 Justice Kennedy meant this as a bad thing, 
but a proponent of BCRA’s soft money ban might respond by simply 
stating, “exactly.” Political parties, the BCRA proponent may argue, 
should be formed when broad swaths of people come together to 
achieve common political ends. They should not be formed at the 
whim of a single billionaire. Justice Kennedy, it seems, would suggest 
that the BCRA supporter’s conception of political parties is wrong. 
This disagreement between Justice Kennedy and the hypothetical 
BCRA supporter presents a crucial point. In disputing whether 
BCRA’s soft money ban furthers the anticorruption interest, the two 
would come to loggerheads over the character of our democracy. 
Specifically, their disagreement is over how egalitarian or plutocratic 
the aspects of our democracy concerning the formation of political 
parties ought to be. 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co.112 illustrates a similar relationship between the 
anticorruption interest and a Justice’s assumptions about democratic 
norms. At issue in Caperton was whether a West Virginia Supreme 
 
 108. See Michael Levy, United States Presidential Election of 1992, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA (Oct. 27, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-presidential-
election-of-1992. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Reform Party, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Reform_Party (last visited Apr. 5, 
2020). 
 111. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 287 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010). 
 112. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
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Court Justice’s failure to recuse himself violated due process when one 
of the litigants before him had financed his campaign through 
independent expenditures.113 Massey Coal’s chairman, Don 
Blankenship, spent $3 million on independent expenditures114 in an 
effort to elect the Justice to West Virginia’s highest court. The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the West Virginia Justice’s failure to recuse 
himself was unconstitutional.115 The Court reached this conclusion 
based on the “risk that Blankenship’s influence engendered actual 
bias,” an apparent recognition from Justice Kennedy that independent 
expenditures can improperly influence a beneficiary thereof.116 
Why, then, does Justice Kennedy not recognize the same danger 
when the beneficiary is a legislator and not a judge? The answer has 
everything to do with Justice Kennedy’s assumptions about the 
legislative and judicial roles in our democracy. Justice Kennedy would 
argue that judges should not be influenced by anything but the merits 
of the case before them, making bias created by campaign 
expenditures an abject evil. Legislators, however, are permitted to 
favor their electoral financiers. Indeed, per Justice Kennedy, 
“[f]avoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative 
politics,” and it is natural for an “elected representative to favor certain 
policies . . . and [the] contributors who support those policies.”117 
Justice Kennedy’s ideas about what corrupts the judge and the 
legislator, then, are formed by his underlying beliefs about how judges 
and legislators are supposed to operate in our democracy.118 
Two valuable works of scholarship explain this corruption-
democracy relationship in a manner that I will draw upon in this 
Article. The first is Professor Hellman’s Defining Corruption and 
 
 113. Id. at 872. 
 114. More specifically, Blankenship contributed $2.5 million to a § 527 organization that in 
turn spent the money to support the Justice. He also directly spent $500,000 on independent 
expenditures and contributed $1,000 to the Justice’s campaign committee. See id. at 873. 
 115. Id. at 872. 
 116. Id. at 885. 
 117. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010). 
 118. Cf. Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law, 27 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 887, 923–24 (2011) (criticizing modern campaign finance jurisprudence for resting on 
subjective political judgments about democratic values). But see Kang, supra note 4, at 56 
(distinguishing Caperton from Citizens United based on “the ex post treatment of th[e] corruption 
risk in Caperton [, that is, recusal,] instead of the ex ante treatment of the same risk through 
campaign finance regulation in Citizens United [, that is, restriction]”). 
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Constitutionalizing Democracy.119 Hellman posits that “corruption is 
a derivative concept,” dependent “on a theory of the institution or 
official involved.”120 She offers, by way of example, the question of 
whether giving preferential treatment to your brother-in-law is a form 
of corruption.121 The answer depends entirely on whether the 
preferential treatment “violate[s] the norms for the actor and 
institution involved.”122 If you are a government official and hire your 
brother-in-law for a public position despite the fact that he is less 
qualified than other applicants, then you have very likely acted 
corruptly.123 If, on the other hand, you plan a holiday dinner and invite 
your brother-in-law over a more pleasant dinner guest, then you have 
not acted corruptly. Family connectedness in the institution of holiday 
dining is understood as a proper criterion for selecting guests.124 For 
other institutions, whether familial preference is a form of corruption 
is a murkier question. Preferential familial treatment in the admissions 
process to an exclusive school, for example, may be a gray area.125 
Whether the act is corrupt or not “depends on a theory of the institution 
involved,” in this case, the exclusive school.126 
When the question involves whether a certain act constitutes 
“political corruption in a democracy,” then, the answer depends “on a 
theory of democracy.”127 As Hellman ominously puts it, “And therein 
lies the problem.”128 The questions surrounding how a healthy 
democracy operates are likely to be deeply contested.129 It is no 
 
 119. See generally Hellman, supra note 10. 
 120. Id. at 1389. Hellman was not the first to reach this conclusion. For example, she points to 
works by Dennis Thompson, Thomas Burke, Daniel Hays Lowenstein, and Bruce Cain that have 
also concluded that corruption is a derivative concept. See id. at 1395 (discussing DENNIS F. 
THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 28 (1995); 
Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 
127 (1997); Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 111; Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption: Comments on 
Strauss and Cain, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163); see also POST, supra note 9, at 55 (“The nature of 
the state’s interest in regulating corruption . . . depends upon how we understand the official 
obligation (or role morality) of elected representatives.”). 
 121. Hellman, supra note 10, at 1392 (discussing whether nepotism is a form of corruption). 
 122. Id. at 1393. 
 123. Id. at 1392. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1393. 
 127. Id. at 1394. 
 128. Id. at 1396. 
 129. E.g., id. (“[A]n account of what constitutes corruption depends on a theory of democracy; 
yet there is substantial disagreement about what a commitment to democratic representation 
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surprise, then, that a multitude of disputed conceptions of corruption, 
each tracking underlying assumptions about our democracy, have 
emerged in campaign finance jurisprudence.130 
The second work of scholarship useful to understanding this 
corruption-democracy relationship is Dean Post’s Citizens Divided.131 
Post explains that “a primary purpose of First Amendment rights is to 
make possible the value of self-government.”132 To achieve self-
governance, Post argues, the First Amendment must ensure two 
things. First, it must provide for the process of public opinion 
formation.133 Post labels this process “discursive democracy.”134 
Second, it must ensure that elected officials are responsive to public 
opinion.135 Absent both ingredients in this formula for “democratic 
legitimation,”136 Post argues, the People are incapable of engaging in 
self-governance.137 They are, to use the founding-era metaphor, bound 
 
demands.”). See generally David Schultz, The Case for a Democratic Theory of American Election 
Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 259 (2016), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1179&context=penn_law_review_online (illustrating the complexities in creating 
cohesion around a uniform, specific, democratic theory). 
 130. Professor Lori Ringhand’s Defining Democracy: The Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance 
Dilemma is also relevant to this discussion. See Lori A. Ringhand, Defining Democracy: The 
Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Dilemma, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 77 (2004). She posits that in 
campaign finance cases, “the rights the judiciary is charged with protecting cannot themselves be 
defined (and thereby protected) without judicial reliance on some underlying vision of what 
democracy itself should look like.” Id. at 79. The Court’s “corruption-based analytical 
methodology” hides this “democracy-defining dilemma” by employing “the superficially 
democracy-neutral language of rights protection.” Id. at 80. Ringhand, in other words, attributes 
the Court’s lack of clarity in defining corruption to the relationship between the First Amendment 
rights at issue in campaign finance cases and democratic theory, rather than the relationship 
between corruption and democracy. 
 131. See generally POST, supra note 9. 
 132. Id. at 4. 
 133. See generally id. at 23–43 (discussing how the First Amendment provides for the process 
of public opinion formation by encouraging “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” speech on public 
issues). 
 134. Id. at 35–36 (using the term “discursive democracy” to mean “communicative processes 
in which an ever-changing population continuously articulates its ever-evolving experience”). 
 135. Id. at 16 (“[R]epresentative government cannot embody the value of self-government 
without trust and confidence between representatives and constituents, such that the latter believe 
they are indeed ‘represented’ by the former. I shall call this relationship representative integrity.”). 
 136. See id. at 36 (“Discursive democracy postulates that by participating in the ongoing and 
never-ending formation of public opinion, and by establishing institutions designed to make 
government continuously responsive to public opinion, the people might come to develop a ‘sense 
of ownership’ of ‘their’ government and so enjoy the benefit of self-government. . . . I shall 
henceforth call this ongoing process of ownership democratic legitimation.”). 
 137. See id. at 60 (“Unless there is public trust that elections select officials who are responsive 
to public opinion . . . First Amendment rights . . . cannot produce democratic legitimation. They 
cannot connect communication to self-government.”); id. at 63 (“Americans cannot maintain the 
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“in chains” to the wills of their elected officials; “slaves” without 
representation.138 
Using Post’s First Amendment framework, the narrow 
conception of corruption championed by Justice Kennedy and 
likeminded jurists reflects a deeply-seeded need to protect the 
discursive process of public opinion formation.139 For example, these 
Justices have consistently rejected the proposition that “government 
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others.”140 To them, this concept is 
 
blessing of self-government unless they believe that elections produce representatives who are 
responsive to public opinion.”). 
 138. Id. at 8 (“[T]he people of England deceive themselves, when they fancy they are free: they 
are so, in fact, only during the interval between a dissolution of one parliament and the election of 
another; for, as soon as a new one is elected, they are again in chains, and lose all their virtue as a 
people.” (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT; OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT 266 (John James Rousseau trans., London, G.G.J. 
& J. Robinson 1791) (1762))); id. (“Those who are taxed without their own consent, expressed by 
themselves or their representatives, are slaves. We are taxed without our own consent, expressed 
by ourselves or our representatives. We are therefore—slaves.” (emphases omitted) (quoting 1 
JOHN DICKINSON, THE WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON: POLITICAL WRITINGS 1764–1774, at 357 
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., Philadelphia, Historical Soc’y of Pa. 1895))); see also McCutcheon v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 236 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“An influential 18th-
century continental philosopher had argued that in a representative democracy, the people lose 
control of their representatives between elections, during which interim periods they were ‘in 
chains.’” (quoting ROUSSEAU, supra note 138, at 265–66)). 
 139. Moreover, I would add, it reflects a deeply-seeded need to protect a very specific ideal 
about that discursive process; namely, that it be performed in a purely free-market manner, with no 
“voice” restricted based on the identity of the speaker or volume of speech. See, e.g., Stephen E. 
Gottlieb, Sources of Conservative Thinking on Democracy, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 269, 269–
72 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-269.pdf; Schultz, 
supra note 129, at 261–62 (and works cited therein). Only the speech with the utmost potential for 
corruption—money given directly to candidates—can possibly be restricted, per this conception. 
Even then, the restriction is suspect in light of the interference with free-market public opinion 
formation it creates. Post is critical of this approach, rejecting a laissez-faire approach to public 
opinion formation in favor of one that distinguishes between voices that can (natural people) and 
cannot (corporations) experience democratic legitimation. POST, supra note 9, at 76–80. The big 
exception to the Court’s laissez-faire dogma is foreign electoral speech, which Justice Kennedy et 
al. believe the government may prohibit from public discourse. See Bluman v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 n.4 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d mem., 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). As Hasen 
points out, this position in Bluman creates an area of significant incoherence in the jurisprudence. 
See HASEN, supra note 9, at 113. If the identity of the speaker is irrelevant in determining whether 
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, then why can corporations, but not foreigners, 
participate in the free-market arena of public discourse? See id. at 113–17. 
 140. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976); see also Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 741 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 
U.S. 310, 349–50 (2010); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 324 (2003) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 685 (1990) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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“wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed ‘to 
secure “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse 
and antagonistic sources,”’ and ‘“to assure unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people.”’”141 When it comes to corporate expenditures, Justice 
Scalia explicitly chided the Austin majority for departing “from long-
accepted premises of our political system regarding the benevolence 
that can be expected of government in managing the arena of public 
debate.”142 Further, these Justices have repeatedly focused on the 
supposed importance of corporate speech to the public, rather than the 
unique characteristics of the corporation.143 
Justices White, Breyer, Stevens, and their similarly minded 
colleagues, on the other hand, have expressed conceptions of 
corruption that track an emphasis on the responsiveness aspect of self-
government identified by Post. These Justices’ concerns over the 
purchasing of access and influence, and dependence corruption, 
indicate a fear that legislators will shift responsiveness from their 
constituents’ prevailing public opinion to the election-financier 
class.144 Their fear is that legislators will “decide issues not on the 
merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the 
 
 141. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 
(1964)). 
 142. Austin, 494 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 143. E.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775–76 (1978) (rebuking the lower 
court for framing “the principal question in th[e] case as whether and to what extent corporations 
have First Amendment rights” rather than “whether [the Massachusetts law in question] abridges 
expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect”); id. at 777 (“The inherent worth of the 
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its 
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”); Austin, 494 U.S. at 698–99 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing Michigan’s restriction of corporate independent expenditures 
in terms of “society’s interest in free and informed discussion on political issues, a discourse vital 
to the capacity for self-government”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–50 (citing Buckley and 
Bellotti and advancing a speech-focused, rather than speaker-focused, analysis of corporate 
expenditures). 
 144. E.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 235–37 (2014) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (describing the First Amendment’s function in facilitating political discussion for the 
purpose of ensuring legislative responsiveness); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 470 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A Government captured by corporate interests, [citizens] 
may come to believe, will be neither responsive to their needs nor willing to give their views a fair 
hearing.”); id. at 471 (“[U]nregulated corporate electioneering might diminish the ability of citizens 
to hold officials accountable to the people.” (quotation omitted)); id. at 472 (describing “democratic 
responsiveness” as one of the “fundamental concerns” of the Austin Court and legislatures that have 
passed corporate expenditure restrictions); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144 (describing contributions 
to a political party as creating “a sense of obligation” from elected officials to the contributors). 
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wishes of” their financiers—a result that is “troubling to a functioning 
democracy.”145 
These Justices, moreover, prioritize this responsiveness concern 
over plausible concerns about public opinion formation.146 Their 
willingness to uphold restrictions on large independent expenditures 
provides a prime example.147 As the Court has noted on many 
occasions, restrictions on expenditures eliminate a greater quantity of 
speech than do restrictions on contributions.148 Concomitantly, 
however, expenditures present a substantial threat to democratic 
responsiveness when wealthy individuals and entities are allowed to 
make them without restriction. For these Justices, whatever quantity 
of speech is lost when large independent expenditures are restricted is 
worth the gains made in responsiveness. 
B.  Deference: Rights and Processes or Legislative Expertise 
The relationship between corruption and democracy does not, 
however, fully explain the Justices’ disagreement over the 
anticorruption interest. In addition to the Justices’ underlying 
disagreements about democracy, a deep divide over the deference 
owed to legislatures enacting campaign finance laws animates the 
varying understandings of the anticorruption interest. The group of 
Justices who prioritize legislative responsiveness also believe that 
legislative expertise in matters of corruption and democracy justifies 
deferring to the legislature’s understanding of the anticorruption 
 
 145. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153. 
 146. E.g., McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 237 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Insofar as corruption cuts the 
link between political thought and political action, a free marketplace of political ideas loses its 
point.”). 
 147. See generally McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 393 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (holding that challenged sections of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971, amended by The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1992, did not violate 
the First Amendment); Austin, 494 U.S. at 652 (holding that challenged sections of the Michigan 
Campaign Finance Act did not violate corporations’ First Amendment rights). 
 148. E.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134–35 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 
146, 161 (2003) and Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386–88 (2000)); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1976) (comparing FECA’s expenditure restrictions with its contribution 
restrictions and finding that “expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial 
rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech,” while “a 
limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political 
committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free 
communication”); id. at 19–20 (proposition that contribution limits, unlike limits on expenditures, 
“entail[] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free 
communication”). 
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interest (the Deferential Justices). The group of Justices who prioritize 
public opinion formation, on the other hand, believes that political 
process concerns and the presence of individual rights justify greater 
intervention in campaign finance cases (the Interventionist Justices). 
Justice White’s dissent in Buckley, Justice Stevens’ dissent in 
Citizens United, and Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri Government PAC149 illustrate the Deferential Justices’ 
position. Though the Buckley Court adopted a deferential approach to 
defining corruption in upholding FECA’s contribution limitations,150 
it took a decidedly interventionist approach in striking the law’s 
$1,000 independent expenditure limitation. The Court refused to credit 
Congress’ judgment that independent expenditures could lead to 
corruption or its appearance. Such expenditures did not “presently 
appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to 
those identified with large campaign contributions,” according to the 
Court.151 
Justice White’s dissent chastised the Court’s willingness to 
supplant Congress’ position on the corruptive potential of independent 
expenditures with its own judgment. He opined,  
Congress was plainly of the view that these expenditures also 
have corruptive potential; but the Court strikes down the 
provision, strangely enough claiming more insight as to what 
may improperly influence candidates than is possessed by 
the majority of Congress that passed this bill and the 
President who signed it.152  
 
 149. 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 150. For example, the Buckley majority wrote that “Congress could legitimately conclude that 
the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is . . . critical if confidence in the system 
of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 
(alteration omitted) (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 
413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). The Court also declined the plaintiffs’ invitation to question the means 
that Congress used to further its anticorruption interest, holding that “Congress was surely entitled 
to conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure, and that contribution ceilings were a 
necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a 
system permitting unlimited financial contributions.” Id. at 28. Likewise, the Court found that 
Congress was “justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of 
impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary 
contributions be eliminated.” Id. at 30. 
 151. Id. at 46. 
 152. Id. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Instead of flouting its finding, Justice White continued, the Court 
should have deferred to “congressional judgment,” and upheld 
FECA’s expenditure restrictions.153 
Justice Stevens in his dissent in Citizens United takes a similar 
position. In response to the Court’s holding that corruption was limited 
to narrow quid pro quo exchanges,154 he argued that the Court should 
“start by acknowledging that ‘Congress surely has both wisdom and 
experience in these matters that is far superior to ours,’” as it had 
“explicitly” and “forcefully” done on many prior occasions.155 This 
expertise, he continued, had produced a congressional judgment 
regarding the corruptive potential of corporate expenditures that had 
remained “essentially unchanged throughout a century of careful 
legislative adjustment,” creating additional justification for exercising 
deference.156 By not acknowledging Congress’ expertise, the majority 
took a position that “discounts the value of [the anticorruption interest] 
to zero,” and denies “Congress’ authority to regulate corporate 
spending on elections.”157 
In Shrink Missouri Government PAC, Justice Breyer offers a 
slightly different justification for deferring to Congress in defining 
corruption.158 He characterized campaign finance cases as involving 
“constitutionally protected interests [that] lie on both sides of the legal 
equation.”159 “On the one hand, a decision to contribute money to a 
campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern.”160 “On the other 
hand, restrictions upon the amount any one individual can contribute 
to a particular candidate seek to protect the integrity of the electoral 
process,” and “to democratize the influence that money itself may 
 
 153. Id. at 260. 
 154. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357–60 (2010). 
 155. Id. at 461 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Colo. Republican 
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 650 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)) (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 158 (2003) and Fed. 
Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003)). 
 156. Id. (quoting Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162 n.9); see also id. at 436 (“Congress’ ‘careful 
legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws, in a cautious advance, step by step, to account 
for the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations . . . warrants considerable 
deference,’ and ‘reflects a permissible assessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the 
electoral process.’” (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 
209 (1982))); id. at 479 (“In a democratic society, the longstanding consensus on the need to limit 
corporate campaign spending should outweigh the wooden application of judge-made rules.”). 
 157. Id. at 463–64. 
 158. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 377 (2000). 
 159. Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 160. Id. 
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bring to bear upon the electoral process.”161 These competing interests 
must be weighed against each other, a task best left to legislatures 
given their “significantly greater institutional expertise . . . in the field 
of election regulation.”162 Given that the legislature “understands the 
problem—the threat to electoral integrity, the need for 
democratization,” the Court should “defer to its political judgment that 
unlimited spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process.”163 
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Shrink Missouri Government PAC 
and Justice Scalia’s dissent in Austin illustrate the approach taken by 
the Interventionist Justices. The Shrink Missouri Government PAC 
Court upheld Missouri’s limitations on contributions to candidates, 
which ranged from $275 to $1,075 depending on the size of the 
relevant electorate.164 In doing so, the Court declined to apply strict 
scrutiny165 and found Missouri’s law justified by the anticorruption 
interest.166 Responding to the Eighth Circuit’s finding that Missouri 
had failed to produce empirical evidence of actual corruption, the 
Court struck a deferential stance: “[t]he quantum of empirical 
evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative 
judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of 
the justification raised.”167 The Court continued that, in campaign 
finance cases, “the dangers of large, corrupt contributions and the 
suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor 
implausible.”168 
 
 161. Id. at 401. 
 162. Id. at 402; see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003) (“The 
less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution limits (Buckley’s ‘closely drawn’ 
scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress’ ability to weigh competing constitutional interests 
in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise.”), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 163. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 403–04 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 164. Id. at 382–83 (majority opinion) (describing Missouri’s contribution limits as ranging from 
$1,075 to $275 and being indexed for inflation); id. at 385 (announcing the Court’s reversal of the 
Eighth Circuit, which had struck Missouri’s contribution limits). 
 165. See id. at 386–89 (discussing Buckley’s bifurcation of contribution and expenditure 
limitations and noting that subsequent cases have made clear that a lower level of judicial scrutiny 
applies to contribution limitations). 
 166. Id. at 393 (finding that the evidence in this case substantiated “the congressional concerns 
reflected in Buckley” and therefore supported Missouri’s enactment of contribution limitations). 
 167. Id. at 391. 
 168. Id. 
(7) 53.4_BLOOMBERG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/2/20  10:28 AM 
930 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:895 
Justice Thomas would have taken a different approach. To begin, 
he would have applied strict scrutiny,169 given that “[p]olitical speech 
is the primary object of First Amendment protection.”170 The Court’s 
decision to apply “something less—much less—than strict scrutiny” 
“balance[ed] away . . . First Amendment rights.”171 He then would 
have found Missouri’s anticorruption interest insufficient to justify the 
resultant restriction on political speech. Missouri’s contribution limits 
“are not narrowly tailored to that harm” because they prohibit “all 
donors who wish to contribute in excess of the cap from doing so and 
restrict[] donations without regard to whether the donors pose any real 
corruption risk.”172 Missouri, per Justice Thomas, was not justified in 
concluding that more narrow regulations were inadequate to prevent 
corruption—at least not when speech rights were implicated by its 
law. Instead, Missouri could have addressed its “interest in curtailing 
corruption” through bribery and disclosure laws.173 Moreover, even if 
those more narrowly tailored means were insufficient to stamp out 
corruption, Justice Thomas would not have allowed Missouri to limit 
contributions to address the evil of corruption. Instead, he opined that 
“when it comes to a significant infringement on our fundamental 
liberties, that some undesirable conduct may not be deterred is an 
insufficient justification to sweep in vast amounts of protected 
political speech.”174 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Austin illustrates the interventionist 
Justices’ political process concern.175 That concern, specifically, is 
that campaign finance laws are enacted not to prevent corruption, but 
to protect incumbents. In Austin, Justice Scalia speculated that the 
Michigan legislature that restricted corporate independent 
expenditures may have had noble objectives, but “governmental 
abridgment of liberty is always undertaken with the very best of . . . 
objectives.”176 Accordingly, “[t]he incumbent politician who says he 
welcomes full and fair debate is no more to be believed than the 
 
 169. Id. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[C]ontribution caps . . . should be met with the utmost 
skepticism and should receive the strictest scrutiny.”). 
 170. Id. at 410–11. 
 171. Id. at 421. 
 172. Id. at 428. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 429. 
 175. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679–95 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 176. Id. at 692. 
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entrenched monopolist who says he welcomes full and fair 
competition.”177 This skepticism is warranted even when the 
restriction treats incumbents and challengers equally, Justice Scalia 
argued in McConnell, as “any restriction upon a type of campaign 
speech that is equally available to challengers and incumbents tends 
to favor incumbents.”178 Rather than deferring to congressional 
expertise on matters of corruption, then, Justice Scalia would 
intervene to protect the political processes that he views as being 
threatened by campaign finance laws. 
 
In sum, Part II of this Article demonstrated that the Justices’ 
beliefs about two subsidiary issues animate their various 
understandings of corruption. First, the Justices’ conceptions of 
corruption are animated by their beliefs about democracy. More 
specifically, the broader conceptions of corruption expressed by one 
group of Justices reflect their desire to protect legislative 
responsiveness, while the narrower conceptions of corruption 
expressed by the other group of Justices reflect their desire to protect 
public opinion formation. Second, the Justices’ conceptions of 
corruption are animated by their beliefs about judicial deference and 
intervention. The Deferential Justices—who conceive of corruption 
broadly and want to protect legislative responsiveness—believe the 
Court should defer to legislative expertise on matters of corruption and 
democracy in campaign finance cases. The Interventionist Justices—
who conceive of corruption narrowly and want to protect public 
opinion formation—believe the Court should intervene to protect 
individual rights and political processes in campaign finance cases. 
III.  THE COMPROMISE METHODOLOGY 
A.  Introducing the Methodology 
Having unpacked the Justices’ disagreement over the meaning of 
corruption in campaign finance cases, I will now offer a proposal for 
how that disagreement can be resolved. My aim here is to identify a 
methodology for deciding campaign finance cases that constitutes a 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 249 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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compromise—middle ground whereby the concerns raised by both 
groups of Justices are reasonably satisfied. This patch of common 
ground is often left untrodden by proposals to reform how campaign 
finance cases are decided, which typically involve more drastic 
reforms that are unlikely to garner support from the Interventionist 
Justices and their like-minded jurists.179 These reforms are dependent 
on the Court’s composition changing in a manner that leaves a 
majority comprised of dedicated Deferential Justices who are willing 
to disregard plausible stare decisis concerns. The Compromise 
Methodology, on the other hand, is a reform designed for a situation 
in which power is more balanced between the Deferential and 
Interventionist Justices, such that finding middle ground becomes 
necessary or desirable. The emergence of a centrist Justice or of a 
reform-minded Justice who prefers an incremental approach could, for 
example, create this dynamic. 
To constitute a compromise, the methodology must force the 
Court to consider the Deferential Justices’ views on democracy and 
deference—views that are currently neglected by the Court’s 
Interventionist majority180—while still accounting for the 
Interventionist Justices’ public opinion formation, political process, 
and individual rights concerns. The Compromise Methodology 
balances these interests by creating a conditional deference 
mechanism that incorporates both groups of Justices’ democratic 
concerns. Specifically, the methodology instructs that when a 
campaign finance law protects against a practice that impairs either 
legislative responsiveness or public opinion formation, the Court must 
defer to Congress’ finding that the law was enacted pursuant to the 
 
 179. See infra Section III.C (discussing proposals to introduce a new government interest in 
campaign finance cases). 
 180. For instance, in defining the anticorruption interest in Citizens United, the majority made 
a series of democratic judgments to justify its narrow quid pro quo conception of corruption. The 
Court concluded that “[t]he appearance of influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to 
lose faith in our democracy.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. It then posited that “the electorate 
will [not] refuse to take part in democratic governance because of additional political speech made 
by a corporation,” and that “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption.” Id. (quotation 
omitted). While paying lip service to the concept of deferring to legislative judgments in general, 
id. at 361, the Court ultimately reached these conclusions without deferring to Congress’ very 
different understandings of corruption and democracy. The Court also minimized the legislative 
responsiveness issues raised by corporate independent expenditures, reasoning that such issues 
create “cause for concern,” but that Congress nonetheless cannot address that concern by restricting 
independent expenditures. Id. 
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anticorruption interest. If not, the Court must instead intervene and 
find that the law was not passed pursuant to the anticorruption interest. 
Except for introducing this conditional deference mechanism, the 
Compromise Methodology would not alter the Court’s ordinary 
decision-making process: the Court would still determine whether the 
campaign finance law burdens First Amendment rights and whether 
the restriction is sufficiently tailored to the anticorruption interest. 
Preserving these other features of the Court’s current decisional 
process gives the Interventionist Justices latitude to define and protect 
individual rights and political process. 
The Compromise Methodology can be expressed in three steps: 
Step I: Determine whether the campaign finance law 
burdens First Amendment rights. 
Step II: Ask whether the campaign finance law protects 
against a practice that impairs either legislative 
responsiveness or public opinion formation. If so, defer to 
Congress’ finding that the restriction was enacted pursuant 
to the anticorruption interest. If not, intervene and find that 
the restriction was not enacted pursuant to the anticorruption 
interest. 
Step III: Determine whether the campaign finance law is 
sufficiently tailored to the anticorruption interest. 
This proposed reform would accommodate both groups of 
Justices’ perspectives on democracy and deference in campaign 
finance cases. First, the methodology accommodates the 
Interventionist Justices’ concern with defining and protecting 
individual rights.181 It does so at Step I, where the Court retains its 
ordinary authority to determine whether a law burdens First 
Amendment rights. This will allow the Court to preserve the long-
standing principle that money used to facilitate political speech is 
treated as speech itself under the First Amendment, and that 
corporations are persons for political speech purposes.182 Likewise, 
 
 181. See infra Section III.B. 
 182. See Austin, 494 U.S. 652 at 657 (“Certainly, the use of funds to support a political 
candidate is ‘speech’; independent campaign expenditures constitute ‘political expression “at the 
core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.”’ . . . The mere fact that the 
Chamber is a corporation does not remove its speech from the ambit of the First Amendment.” 
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) and First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 777 (1978)); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784 (finding “no support . . . for the proposition that speech 
that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply 
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Step III of the methodology serves a rights-protection function. At that 
step, the Court retains its ordinary discretion to assess whether a 
campaign finance law is sufficiently tailored to the anticorruption 
interest. If the campaign finance law is not so circumscribed, the Court 
may strike the law to protect individual rights. 
Second, the Compromise Methodology accommodates the 
Interventionist Justices’ political process concerns. A loose nexus 
between a campaign finance law and the anticorruption interest may 
signal an ulterior legislative motive, such as incumbency protection. 
Allowing the Court to conduct its tailoring inquiry without deferring 
to Congress, at Step III, thus gives the Court an opportunity to 
intervene where political process concerns may be particularly 
warranted. Step II of the methodology may similarly be employed to 
protect political processes. A campaign finance law that neither 
protects legislative responsiveness nor protects public opinion 
formation—and thus falls outside the scope of the anticorruption 
interest under the methodology—may well be driven by incumbency 
protectionism or another nefarious motive. 
Third, the conditional deference mechanism employed at Step II 
of the methodology vindicates the Deferential Justices’ views on 
democracy and deference. That step treats the Justices’ legislative 
responsiveness concern as legitimate, without disregarding the 
Interventionist Justices’ public opinion formation concern, by framing 
the anticorruption interest in terms of both concerns. And, Step II will 
accommodate the Deferential Justices’ desire to defer to legislative 
expertise on matters of corruption in most cases. The methodology 
obligates the Court to defer to the legislature’s understanding of 
corruption whenever the legislature enacts a campaign finance law 
that addresses a threat to legislative responsiveness or to public 
opinion formation. Requiring this deference takes the task of defining 
corruption largely out of the Court’s hands, and places it with 
Congress and the states. 
B.  Application to Case Law 
To contextualize this somewhat nuanced reform, I shall now 
demonstrate the methodology’s application to two campaign finance 
 
because its source is a corporation”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (“[T]his Court has never suggested 
that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a 
nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”). 
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cases: Citizens United and NCPAC. In Citizens United, the Court 
struck federal law’s restriction on independent expenditures funded 
from corporate general treasuries.183 In doing so, it reasoned that 
corporate political speech was entitled to First Amendment protection, 
and that the restriction constituted an “outright ban” on protected 
speech.184 The Court then applied strict scrutiny and asked whether the 
speech restriction was narrowly tailored to a compelling government 
interest.185 Defining the anticorruption interest in terms of quid pro 
quo exchanges,186 the Court concluded that independent expenditures 
carried no corruptive potential187 and answered the tailoring question 
in the negative.188 
Applying the Compromise Methodology to the case would not 
impact the Court’s initial holding that the First Amendment includes 
protection for corporate political speech; nor would it alter the Court’s 
decision to apply strict scrutiny. However, once the Court begins its 
strict scrutiny inquiry, the methodology would prevent the Court from 
limiting the anticorruption interest to narrow quid pro quo corruption. 
Instead of the Court defining corruption itself, it would assess whether 
the corporate expenditure restriction protects against a practice that 
impairs legislative responsiveness or public opinion formation. If so, 
the Court would defer to the legislature’s conception of corruption and 
determine that the restriction furthers the anticorruption interest. 
Though the result would not be certain, the Citizens United Court 
would have been hard-pressed to conclude that the corporate 
expenditure restriction did not protect against a practice that impairs 
legislative responsiveness. Indeed, even the Interventionist Justices 
have conceded that large expenditures raise responsiveness concerns, 
as legislators will tend to favor those who spend large amounts of 
money on the legislators’ behalves.189 And, given corporations’ 
abilities to amass large amounts of wealth in the economic 
marketplace,190 Congress could have reasonably concluded that 
removing the favoritism created by the deployment of that amassed 
 
 183. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. 
 184. Id. at 337. 
 185. Id. at 340. 
 186. Id. at 359–60. 
 187. Id. at 357. 
 188. Id. (“The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here in question.”). 
 189. See supra notes 100, 117. 
 190. See supra note 27. 
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wealth would improve legislative responsiveness to public opinion. 
The corporate independent expenditure restriction, then, furthers the 
anticorruption interest under the Compromise Methodology. 
Having reached this conclusion, the Citizens United Court would 
then have taken up the narrow tailoring inquiry. This inquiry would 
likely have been a matter of considerable debate. In some campaign 
finance cases, Justices have concluded that small and non-profit 
corporations can be treated the same as large for-profit corporations, 
while in other cases Justices have drawn distinctions between those 
categories.191 And, BCRA—along with 2 U.S.C. § 441b—restricted 
all corporate general treasury expenditures, even those in small 
amounts.192 Perhaps the Court would ultimately find that the corporate 
expenditure restriction was not narrowly tailored because it applied to 
small and non-profit corporations, or because it restricted $1 
expenditures as well as $1 million expenditures. 
Regardless of the ultimate conclusion on the tailoring inquiry, 
applying the Compromise Methodology to the facts of Citizens United 
would narrow the Court’s holding substantially. The Court’s current 
quid pro quo understanding of corruption means that Congress has no 
interest in restricting corporate expenditures, even if doing so is 
strictly necessary to protect legislative responsiveness. Under the 
Compromise Methodology, the Court would conclude that the 
anticorruption interest does extend to corporate expenditures. And, if 
the corporate expenditure restriction at issue in Citizens United were 
not narrowly tailored to that interest, Congress would have the 
opportunity to revise the law to make it more exacting. In other words, 
the Compromise Methodology changes the holding of Citizens United 
from there is no government interest that allows Congress to restrict 
corporate expenditures to Congress may restrict corporate 
expenditures, but in this case, it did not sufficiently tailor its 
restriction. 
 
 191. Compare, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 268 
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that “the threat 
from corporate political activity will vary depending on the particular characteristics of a given 
corporation,” but concluding that the differences between non-profit and for-profit corporations are 
distinctions in degree, not in kind), with Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354–55 (emphasizing the 
corporate independent expenditure restriction’s effect on small and non-profit corporations), and 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 713 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(finding the majority’s “hostility to the corporate form” irrelevant to non-profit corporations), 
overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 192. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320–21 (describing BCRA and 2 U.S.C. § 441b). 
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I turn now to NCPAC. The NCPAC Court struck a law that 
prohibited political committees from spending more than $1,000 in 
support of a presidential candidate who accepted public funding.193 
The Court found such expenditures to be protected speech under the 
First Amendment,194 and framed the government’s anticorruption 
interest as being centered around the prevention of quid pro quo 
exchanges.195 The Court then concluded that political committees’ 
independent expenditures did not cause corruption or the appearance 
of corruption.196 
Despite the surface-level similarities between NCPAC and 
Citizens United,197 applying the Compromise Methodology to the 
former leads to a quite different analysis than does its application to 
the latter. The distinction arises at Step II of the methodology, when 
the NCPAC Court is asked to determine whether the law in question 
protects legislative responsiveness or public opinion formation. 
Unlike the expenditures at issue in Citizens United, expenditures made 
by the NCPAC political committees could only be funded by relatively 
small contributions. Contributions to political committees were 
capped at $5,000 per annum, meaning that political committees could 
only amplify their political speech via the expenditure of vast sums of 
money if a large number of people supported their speech.198 That is 
to say, the political committees were “mechanisms by which large 
numbers of individuals of modest means can join together in 
organizations which serve to amplify the voice of their adherents.”199 
Indeed, “in 1979–1980 approximately 101,000 people contributed an 
average of $75 each to NCPAC and in 1980 approximately 100,000 
 
 193. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 482 (1985) (“If a Presidential candidate elects public financing, [26 
USCS § 9012(f)] makes it a criminal offense for independent ‘political committees’ . . . to expend 
more than $1,000 to further that candidate’s election.”). 
 194. Id. at 496 (“Having concluded that the PAC’s expenditures are entitled to full First 
Amendment protection . . . .”). 
 195. Id. at 497 (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political 
favors.”). 
 196. Id. at 497–98. 
 197. Both cases, for example, involve laws that restrict entities from making independent 
expenditures in federal elections, and both cases rely on a quid pro quo conception of corruption. 
 198. See supra note 49. 
 199. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 494 (quotation and alteration omitted); see also id. at 495 (noting that 
the contributions received by the political committees in NCPAC were “predominantly small and 
thus do not raise the same concerns as the sizable contributions involved in [California Medical 
Association v. Federal Election Commission]” (referencing Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981))). 
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people contributed an average of $25 each to [NCPAC’s co-Plaintiff,] 
FCM.”200 
This characteristic of political committees makes it far less likely 
that the Court would find that the law’s independent expenditure 
restriction protects legislative responsiveness. A political committee 
“speaks” by funding its expenditures with contributions from the 
public. If it wants to make a $10,000,000 expenditure, its message 
must necessarily be supported by at least 2,000 people; and, based on 
NCPAC’s $75-per-contribution average, over 130,000 people. The 
expenditure is a product of public opinion, and prohibiting it therefore 
does little-to-nothing to protect legislative responsiveness. Instead, it 
hinders both responsiveness to, and formation of, public opinion. 
Under the Compromise Methodology, then, the NCPAC Court would 
likely have intervened at Step II and found that the political committee 
expenditure restriction did not further the anticorruption interest. 
C.  Comparison to Other Reforms 
Having introduced the Compromise Methodology and 
demonstrated its applicability to the case law, this subpart 
distinguishes the methodology from other proposed reforms for 
deciding campaign finance cases. I begin by comparing the 
Compromise Methodology to two other decisional methodologies that 
focus on the issues of democracy and deference. I then address the 
category of reforms that implore the Court to depart from 
anticorruption and recognize a new government interest in campaign 
finance cases. Lastly, I explain that the Compromise Methodology is 
a better option for reform than pushing for a return to the broad 
understanding of corruption articulated before Citizens United. 
1.  Democracy-and-Deference Reforms 
The first democracy-and-deference reform that I shall compare to 
the Compromise Methodology is the methodology proposed by 
Professor Hellman in Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing 
Democracy.201 Hellman persuasively argues that the Court’s modern 
campaign finance jurisprudence fails to air the justifications for 
deference normally present in cases involving subjective democratic 
judgments. She accordingly seeks to craft a prescriptive methodology 
 
 200. Id. at 494. 
 201. See generally Hellman, supra note 10. 
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that accounts for both “the important reasons to avoid intervening in 
legislative prerogatives to define the role of a legislator in a well-
functioning democracy,” and the presence of individual speech rights 
in campaign finance cases.202 To accomplish this task, she looks to 
voting rights and apportionment cases such as Vieth v. Jubelirer203 and 
Reynolds v. Sims.204 In these cases, Professor Hellman argues, “we see 
the Court airing and attending to both the reasons for oversight and the 
reasons for deference.”205 Hellman would have the Court follow suit 
in campaign finance cases, and balance the justifications for deference 
against “the degree of intrusion into the individual right” created by 
the law in question.206 
This Article’s descriptive account reveals two problems with 
Professor Hellman’s methodology. First, the methodology would 
rarely compel the Court to defer to legislative judgments about 
corruption and democracy. Professor Hellman’s methodology is a 
balancing test: the justifications for deference weighed against the 
degree of intrusion into individual rights. In other words, her 
methodology makes the level of deference accorded by the Court in 
defining corruption contingent upon its findings regarding the scope 
of First Amendment rights. Thus, in cases where the Court finds that 
the intrusion on individual rights outweighs the justifications for 
deference, Hellman’s methodology allows the Court to apply its own 
conceptions of corruption and democracy without constraint. 
This will be the result in nearly every campaign finance case. The 
Court since at least Austin has acknowledged that even corporate 
political speech falls under the ambit of the First Amendment.207 And, 
more recently, the Court has characterized corporate independent 
expenditure restrictions as imposing an “outright ban” on political 
speech rights, which lie at the core of the First Amendment.208 The 
degree of intrusion on individual rights, per the Court’s understanding, 
is at its maximum. The Deferential Justices would thus be unsatisfied 
 
 202. Id. at 1389. 
 203. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 204. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See generally Hellman, supra note 10. See also supra Section II.B. 
 205. Hellman, supra note 10, at 1418 (emphasis in original). 
 206. Id. at 1421. 
 207. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990), overruled by 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 208. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337. 
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with Hellman’s methodology, which leaves the task of defining 
corruption in the Court’s hands. 
The Compromise Methodology addresses this shortfall by 
ensuring that the Court’s decision on whether to defer to the 
legislature’s conception of corruption is not contingent on its 
individual rights assessment. Indeed, the justifications for deferring to 
legislative conceptions of corruption—legislative expertise and the 
subjective democratic judgments required in defining corruption—
remain present regardless of the degree of intrusion on individual 
rights. By decoupling individual rights from the decision of whether 
to defer, the Compromise Methodology would allow the Court to 
assess a law’s individual rights burden as it deems fit, yet would often 
still require the Court to defer to legislatures when defining corruption. 
The second challenge posed by Professor Hellman’s 
methodology is that it does not address the Interventionist Justices’ 
political process concerns. Hellman states that her approach “leaves 
open the possibility of Court intervention to police for the 
entrenchment of incumbents,”209 but also cautions against putting too 
much stock in the Interventionist Justices’ incumbency protection 
concern. “Given the Court’s reluctance to review partisan 
gerrymandering claims with regard to the entrenchment of 
incumbents,” she argues, “the Court should be similarly disinclined to 
overturn campaign finance laws on these grounds.”210 
Hellman’s invocation of the Court’s partisan gerrymandering 
jurisprudence does not necessarily provide a satisfactory defense of 
her methodology. This defense implies that the Court is right to ignore 
incumbency protection issues in political gerrymandering cases. Yet, 
it is arguably more plausible to suggest that the Court is not 
sufficiently attuned to incumbency protection issues in political 
gerrymandering cases, and harmonizing campaign finance 
jurisprudence with that aspect of political gerrymandering 
jurisprudence would compound the Court’s error in the latter. 
The second democracy-and-deference-based methodology that I 
wish to distinguish is Professor Ringhand’s methodology in Defining 
Democracy: The Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Dilemma.211 
Professor Ringhand’s aim is to rectify the “democracy-defining 
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dilemma” created when the Court defines individual rights in 
campaign finance cases, rather than when it defines corruption.212 
Nonetheless, her insightful article offers a prescriptive methodology 
upon which the Compromise Methodology builds. 
Ringhand proposes a two-step approach to deciding campaign 
finance cases. First, the Court should ask “what definition of 
democracy—what vision of good government—was the challenged 
statute enacted to enhance or protect, and is that vision constitutionally 
permissible?”213 This analysis must be performed, “without regard to 
the purported substantive scope of the First Amendment,” in order to 
avoid the aforementioned dilemma.214 Second, if the vision of 
democracy is constitutionally permissible, the Court should accept the 
vision and “ask whether the challenged legislation was sufficiently 
related to the legislature’s goal of enhancing or protecting its 
constitutionally acceptable definition of democracy.”215 
Like Professor Hellman’s methodology, Professor Ringhand’s 
methodology leaves the task of defining corruption and democracy in 
the Court’s hands. Professor Ringhand asks the Court to determine 
whether the definition of democracy on which the campaign finance 
law is based is constitutionally permissible. But, her methodology 
does not provide a tool to delineate constitutionally permissible and 
impermissible conceptions of democracy. This democracy-defining 
task is left within the Court’s discretion. In other words, her 
methodology instructs the Court to define the anticorruption interest 
based on its own definition of democracy—a result the Deferential 
Justices want to avoid. 
Ringhand appropriately recognizes this aspect of her 
methodology. She states that “[w]hether a particular vision of 
democracy is constitutionally prohibited or protected, will, of course, 
be a deeply contested question.”216 Thus, she explains that the purpose 
of the second step of her methodology is to ensure that the democratic 
issues in campaign finance cases will be addressed “openly and 
directly, rather than in the ad hoc manner seen in the Court’s existing 
 
 212. Id. at 79 (“[T]he rights the judiciary is charged with protecting cannot themselves be 
defined (and thereby protected) without judicial reliance on some underlying vision of what 
democracy itself should look like.”). 
 213. Id. at 112. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 113. 
 216. Id. at 112. 
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cases.”217 This is an important objective, and one that her methodology 
likely achieves. But the methodology still leaves the task of defining 
democracy in the Court’s hands, even if it extends those hands into the 
open. 
The Compromise Methodology builds upon Ringhand’s approach 
by providing a tool to determine whether the legislature’s conception 
of democracy is permissible. This tool is the conditional deference 
mechanism established at Step II of the Compromise Methodology. 
When a campaign finance law protects legislative responsiveness or 
public opinion formation, the legislature’s conception of corruption—
and, implicitly, the vision of democracy on which that conception is 
premised—is validated as constitutionally permissible. Otherwise, the 
legislature’s conception of corruption is deemed impermissible; it 
cannot justify the campaign finance law at issue. 
2.  Other Government Interests 
Moving beyond democracy-and-deference reforms, the 
Compromise Methodology compares favorably to reforms that are 
premised on the argument that campaign finance laws involve 
government interests aside from anticorruption, such as electoral 
integrity or political equality.218 These “other interests” proposals 
suffer from two drawbacks that the Compromise Methodology avoids. 
First, the anticorruption interest has been the only government interest 
recognized in campaign finance cases, a fact that the Interventionist 
Justices have repeated on several occasions.219 Accordingly, while 
Congress may well be pursuing other government interests when it 
enacts campaign finance laws, the Interventionist Justices will be 
reluctant to sanction a new interest. The Compromise Methodology 
avoids this problem by operating within the anticorruption interest, 
rather than attempting to introduce a new interest. 
Second and relatedly, other interest reforms are more disruptive 
than they need to be: introducing a new government interest is not 
necessary to reforming the jurisprudence to increase legislatures’ 
latitude in regulating election spending. This Article has explained that 
whether a given practice is corruptive depends upon underlying 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. See HASEN, supra note 9, at 36, 186–87 (political equality); POST, supra note 9, at 61–62 
(electoral integrity). 
 219. See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008) (collecting cases). 
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assumptions about democracy.220 The anticorruption interest thus may 
be, and has been, interpreted in a manner that allows Congress to 
prevent practices that impair (i.e. corrupt) electoral integrity, political 
equality, or similar components of a healthy democracy.221 The value 
of introducing a new government interest, then, is mostly 
terminological: terms like “electoral integrity” or “political equality” 
arguably describe the problems intended to be remedied by many 
campaign finance laws more acutely than does the term “corruption.” 
But this terminological improvement is not worth the jurisprudential 
overhaul that would be necessary to introduce new government 
interests, at least when the anticorruption interest is itself sufficient to 
encompass those interests. 
3.  A Return to Broad Corruption 
Lastly, the Compromise Methodology is a better option for 
reform than pushing for a return to the broad understanding of 
corruption articulated before Citizens United.222 First, while the 
selection of a broad conception of corruption instead of a narrow one 
would give Congress more leeway to regulate the financing of 
elections, it would still require the Court to make a judgment about 
what is and is not corruption that the Deferential Justices believe is 
best left for Congress. Second, the reform would allow the Court to 
continue to define corruption without acknowledging the substantive 
democratic judgments underlying that determination. So long as the 
Court is focused on choosing between one definition of corruption or 
another, its underlying democratic judgments about legislative 
responsiveness and public opinion formation will remain largely 
unspoken and unchallenged. Third, the reform frames the Justices’ 
debate about corruption in campaign finance cases as a choice between 
two conceptions of corruption—one broad and one narrow. But the 
choice is more complex, as the careful examination of the case law in 
Part I of this Article revealed. 
 
 220. See supra Section II.A. 
 221. See supra Section I.C (detailing how the Justices’ conceptions of corruption in campaign 
finances cases ranges from narrow quid pro quo transactions to how the deployment of amassed 
wealth in elections harms democracy). 
 222. See, e.g., TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at ch. 16 (arguing for a broad understanding of 
corruption); cf. LESSIG, supra note 3, at 228–32 (advancing a conception of corruption that includes 
legislative dependence on financial support from the wealthy). 
(7) 53.4_BLOOMBERG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/2/20  10:28 AM 
944 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:895 
Finally, the broad-versus-narrow corruption reform arguably 
raises institutional concerns for the Court. Switching from a narrow to 
a broad conception of corruption means returning to the understanding 
of corruption expressed by the Austin and McConnell Courts. As 
Professor Hasen has cynically (yet accurately) observed, what 
changed from McConnell to Citizens United was that Justice Alito 
replaced Justice O’Connor on the Court.223 That change left five votes 
for overturning Austin and McConnell (in part) and replacing the broad 
conception of corruption found in the earlier cases with the narrow one 
previously expressed by dissenting Justices in those cases. Should the 
composition of the Court change in a manner that makes reform 
possible, it would perhaps be unseemly to reverse course again, and 
return the jurisprudence to the exact place it was before Citizens 
United. A reform that rests on a new line of reasoning would mitigate 
the risk of appearing overly ideological, or even indecisive. 
D.  Potential Criticisms 
The Compromise Methodology is subject to criticism from both 
sides of the debate over campaign finance jurisprudence. First, 
observers whose beliefs accord with those of the Interventionist 
Justices may argue that the methodology permits the form of campaign 
finance restriction that they find most troubling: speech equalization 
measures. The Interventionist Justices have argued that the 
government has no interest in “equalizing the relative influence of 
speakers.”224 According to them, equalization measures present both 
public opinion formation and incumbency protection concerns. They 
argue that such attempts to “shap[e] the political debate by insulating 
the electorate from too much exposure to certain views is incompatible 
with the First Amendment,” because “the people in our democracy are 
entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the 
relative merits of conflicting arguments.”225 And, they contend that 
 
 223. HASEN, supra note 9, at 29. 
 224. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 704 (1990) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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laws equalizing the resources available to facilitate speech inherently 
benefit incumbents.226 
This criticism of the Compromise Methodology would be 
overstated. To be sure, the methodology would allow the 
anticorruption interest to encompass one category of campaign finance 
laws that the Interventionist Justices have deemed speech 
equalization: restrictions on large independent expenditures funded by 
a small number of people. Such expenditures may impair legislative 
responsiveness and thus fall within the anticorruption interest’s scope 
under the Compromise Methodology.227 However, the methodology 
would almost certainly not permit the most extreme forms of speech 
equalization: laws that mandate equal financial resources to 
campaigns and committees with unequal popular support. 
Consider, for example, a regulatory regime that limits 
contributions to candidates at $1,000 and also caps the amount 
candidate committees can spend at $1,000,000. This is the 
paradigmatic example of speech equalization that the Interventionist 
Justices fear. One candidate may enjoy immense popular support and 
raise millions of dollars from the public. Another may have more tepid 
support and raise only one million. Despite their unequal popular 
support, the expenditure limitation would equalize their abilities to 
facilitate speech. 
Were the more popular candidate to challenge this hypothetical 
committee expenditure restriction, a Court faithfully applying the 
Compromise Methodology would likely strike down the law. Since 
the regulatory regime imposes a $1,000 contribution limitation, the 
candidates’ financial resources necessarily come from the public at 
large. Therefore, restricting the candidates’ abilities to spend those 
resources does nothing to protect against a practice that impairs 
legislative responsiveness; the resources come from the very source to 
whom the candidates are supposed to be responsive. And, the 
$1,000,000 spending cap does not protect public opinion formation. 
On the contrary, it suppresses public opinion by limiting the public’s 
ability to pool its resources to help the candidate of their choice create 
and amplify political speech. 
 
 226. See id. at 692–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[P]erhaps [the Michigan legislature] was trying 
to assure a ‘balanced’ presentation because it knows that with evenly balanced speech incumbent 
officeholders generally win.”). 
 227. See supra Section III.B (applying the Compromise Methodology to Citizens United). 
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 At Step II of the Compromise Methodology, then, the Court 
would have to conclude that the anticorruption interest does not 
encompass the expenditure restriction. Accordingly, the methodology 
would not allow the government to equalize speech by mandating 
equal resources for candidates with unequal popular support. 
On the other hand, reformers whose beliefs accord with those of 
the Deferential Justices are likely to criticize the methodology’s 
inability to justify many campaign finance restrictions. As 
demonstrated by the above hypothetical, the Compromise 
Methodology makes it difficult to justify expenditure limitations in a 
campaign finance environment that has in place reasonable 
contribution limitations. And, even in an environment without 
contribution limitations, the methodology does not guarantee that 
expenditure limitations are constitutional. A Court applying the 
Compromise Methodology would place most such limitations within 
the anticorruption interest, but the Court could still strike them as not 
being sufficiently tailored to that interest. 
I view this potential criticism as being less about the Compromise 
Methodology itself and more about applying that methodology within 
a jurisprudence that equates money with speech, and corporations with 
natural persons. A less expansive understanding of speech rights 
would make expenditure restrictions constitutional under most any 
decisional methodology: at Step I, there would be no First Amendment 
burden. Reform on this front—to the extent it is desirable—could 
come through a revolutionary change in the Court’s understanding of 
speech rights, but is not possible to achieve through the type of 
evolutionary compromise reform that I seek to advance in this Article. 
In the end, neither the interventionist camp nor the reform-
minded deferential camp is likely to be completely satisfied with the 
Compromise Methodology. Faithful application of the methodology 
would render some policies preferred by reformers constitutional, but 
would continue to prohibit more aggressive restrictions such as the 
speech-equalization measure described herein. Perhaps the fact that 
neither side would be entirely satisfied by the Compromise 
Methodology is indicative of some flaws that I have not identified. Or, 
perhaps it is a sign of a healthy compromise. 
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E.  Summary 
To sum up, the Compromise Methodology locates a middle 
ground for deciding campaign finance cases by vindicating both the 
Deferential and Interventionists Justices’ concerns in campaign 
finance cases. It allows the Court to defer to legislative expertise on 
matters of corruption, while also leaving room for the Court to 
intervene to protect political processes. The methodology validates the 
Deferential Justices’ concern with legislative responsiveness and the 
Interventionist Justices’ concern with public opinion formation by 
employing both to determine the scope of the anticorruption interest. 
And, the methodology allows the Interventionist Justices to protect 
individual rights by allowing the Court to define the scope of 
individual rights, and to conduct its tailoring inquiry, without 
deference to legislatures. For these reasons, the Compromise 
Methodology presents a promising option for resolving the 
disagreements surrounding corruption, democracy, and deference at 
the core of campaign finance jurisprudence. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In 2016, Professors Hellman and Schultz introduced a Special 
Issue on Campaign Finance in the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review Online by calling for more voices in campaign finance 
scholarship.228 The Special Issue sought to “start a conversation” 
about campaign finance, democratic theory, self-government, and 
related issues.229 This Article advances that conversation in important 
ways. Its descriptive account persuasively demonstrates the centrality 
of democracy and deference to the jurisprudence. Its prescriptive 
methodology offers a reasoned approach to deciding cases in a manner 
that accounts for the justifications for deference and intervention, and 
the different theories of democracy, expressed by the Justices in 
campaign finance cases. Still, the conversation surrounding the 
relationship between corruption, democracy, and deference in 
campaign finance jurisprudence remains in its early stages. I echo 
Hellman’s and Schultz’s call for more voices to join that conversation 
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so that we may better our understanding of the jurisprudence and our 
strategy for improving it. 
